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COPYRIGHT’S PRIVATE ORDERING AND THE
“NEXT GREAT COPYRIGHT ACT”
Jennifer E. Rothman†

ABSTRACT
Private ordering plays a significant role in the application of intellectual property laws,
especially in the context of copyright law. In this Article, I highlight some of the dominant
modes of private ordering and consider what formal copyright law should do, if anything, to
engage with private ordering in the copyright space. I conclude that there is not one single
approach that copyright law should take with regard to private ordering, but instead several
different approaches. In some instances, the best option is for the law to get out of the way
and simply continue to provide room for various approaches to flourish. In other contexts,
the copyright statute should actively support private ordering efforts that may be jeopardized
by the current regime. Private ordering may also highlight areas where the law is in need of
reform. This is perhaps most noticeable in the context of fair use which has led to the
proliferation of much of the private ordering. The combination of the unpredictability and
expense of fair use litigation combined with potentially high statutory damages has created a
series of risk-averse litigation-avoidance practices and an underutilization of fair use.
Legislation may be necessary to prevent a lock-in effect of some of these industry practices
and norms. In particular, courts should be barred from using these customs to set the
boundaries of fair use. Revisions to the Copyright Act could also address some of the
uncertainty surrounding fair use and facilitate the use of works in instances that we would
like to encourage. In recent years, copyright holders have used technology and contracts to
greatly limit what users can do with copyrighted works and even with uncopyrightable
elements of those works. Revisions to copyright law should engage with these private efforts
and protect a significant fair use zone. Copyright’s private ordering also reveals some areas
of agreement which merit codification, such as faculty ownership of course materials and
scholarship. Copyright law does not operate in a vacuum and any major revisions to
copyright law must take into consideration the practices that have developed in its wake. As
we look forward to a Copyright Act for the twenty-first century, Congress must not only
consider ways to limit online piracy, but also how to protect the public’s vital space to
engage with, comment on, and rework copyrighted material in light of the myriad practices
that have developed in the shadow of the 1976 Act.

© 2014 Jennifer E. Rothman.
† Professor of Law and Joseph Scott Fellow, Loyola Law School, Loyola Marymount
University, Los Angeles. This article is adapted from remarks given on April 4, 2014 as part
of The Next Great Copyright Act conference held at UC Berkeley. I am grateful to Jane
Ginsburg, Pam Samuelson, and Wendy Gordon for comments on that presentation. I also
thank Moira Lion and Ryan Patterson for their research assistance. Please send comments to
jennifer.rothman@lls.edu or jrothman@alumni.princeton.edu.
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INTRODUCTION

On March 4, 2013, the current Register of Copyrights, Maria Pallante,
called for the “next great copyright act.”1 Congress has followed her lead,
calling for and conducting a number of hearings on what reforms might be
appropriate for our now-aging Copyright Act.2 This major review of
copyright law must include consideration of private-sector activities in the
copyright sphere. These privately generated rules have operated both to
expand and to limit copyright in various ways without the opportunity for
the public to debate or participate in these governing regimes.
The last major overhaul of U.S. copyright law culminated in the passage
of the 1976 Copyright Act.3 Since 1976, changing technology—particularly
the digital revolution—has radically altered the copyright landscape.4 A
variety of piecemeal additions to the Act have tried to address some of these
and other challenges for copyright law.5 Unfortunately, these Band-Aids for
outdated aspects of copyright law have made the law more byzantine,
obsolete, and draconian,6 without actually fixing many of the issues raised by
the digital revolution. In part in reaction to these challenges for copyright
1. See Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315
(2013); see also 159 CONG. REC. D253-01 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2013) (Pallante’s speech before
Congress).
2. See, e.g., A Case Study in Consensus Building: The Copyright Principles Project: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop. and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th
Cong. 1 (2013) (statement of Prof. Pamela Samuelson), available at http://judiciary.house
.gov/_files/hearings/113th/05162013/Samuelson%20Testimony%20051613.pdf; The Scope
of Fair Use: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Internet of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 2 (2014), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/
hearings?ID=8E18A9AA-1AA4-4D7C-8EBF-0284862EC44B.
3. For an excellent discussion of the history of the passage of the 1976 Act, see Jessica
D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987).
4. See DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, COPYRIGHT POLICY,
CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 1 (2013) [hereinafter DEP’T OF
COMMERCE] (“[A]rguably no prior technological change has impacted copyright with a
magnitude comparable to the development of the Internet.”).
5. Some of these changes include the passage of the Digital Audio Home Recording
Act of 1992 and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in 1998.
6. See Jennifer E. Rothman, E-Sports as a Prism for the Role of Evolving Technology in
Intellectual Property, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 317, 318, 328–29 (2013) (discussing the
challenges wrought by technology-specific legislation); Pamela Samuelson, Preliminary
Thoughts on Copyright Reform, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 551, 551 (2007) (criticizing the law’s current
length, complexity, and incomprehensibility); David Nimmer, Codifying Copyright
Comprehensibly, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1233, 1237–39, 1307–44 , 1374–78, 1381–83 (2004)
(describing the many Congressional missteps in copyright law since the passage of the 1976
Act).
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law, private ordering has proliferated in industries that frequently use or
create copyrighted works. Such private ordering has included various forms
of custom, such as industry practices, agreements, guidelines, and community
norms, as well as contracts and technology that alter how copyrighted works
can be used.7 These efforts by private parties have sometimes worked in
harmony with the public law, but at other times at cross-purposes with it.
The public must be given the opportunity to weigh in on these private efforts
as part of any study of today’s copyright law and Congress must consider the
role of private ordering. The Department of Commerce and the Copyright
Office are increasingly acknowledging some aspects of private ordering in the
copyright sphere.8 Thus far, however, the government has not engaged in a
robust analysis of the role of private ordering. Such an analysis is crucial in
the upcoming process of revising our copyright laws. This Article provides
an overview of the dominant modes of private ordering in the copyright
context and makes some preliminary suggestions about possible statutory
revisions that could both support the development of such private
approaches and rein in some of their excesses.
Much of the private ordering has developed to address uncertainties or
failings of the current law, while other aspects of such ordering have sought
to provide alternatives for those who seek something different than what the
basic defaults of copyright offer. There is therefore not one single approach
that formal copyright law should take with regard to private ordering. In
some instances, the best option is for the law to get out of the way and leave
room for a variety of private approaches to flourish. This relatively hands-off
approach has been the dominant mode of formal law to date and has allowed
various communities to best tailor copyright law to their needs. In some
contexts, however, formal law needs to engage more fully with private
ordering. In some instances, the law needs to step in to prevent a lock-in
effect of various problematic industry practices and norms that are altering
the boundaries of copyright law without the appropriate public debate and
7. The term “custom” has been used in the law to “mean many different things, from
regularly occurring industry practices, to social norms, to ongoing practices that have existed
from time immemorial.” Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual
Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1900 n.1 (2007). Despite their differences, all customs share the
common characteristic of being rules developed outside the legal system by communities or
industries that have extra-judicial enforcement mechanisms. I have previously explored how
custom affects the way copyrighted works are used as a de facto matter and also how custom
influences courts’ evaluations in individual copyright cases. See id. at 1909–46.
8. See, e.g., Pallante, supra note 1, at 326 n.65 (pointing to industry agreements that
facilitate the enforcement of copyright online); DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 4, at 22–23
(noting the increasing use of fair use guidelines, but encouraging parties to work with a
diverse set of participants to develop such guidelines).
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legislative adoption. The Copyright Act also may need to actively support
some private ordering that is jeopardized by the current regime.
Part II of the Article considers the risk-averse licensing practices that
have dominated the creative industries and how revisions to copyright law
could limit the negative impact of such customs and even counteract the
pressures that feed this clearance culture. Part III evaluates the recent
proliferation of guidelines and best-practices codes and statements intended
to address the uncertain boundaries of fair use. Revisions to the Copyright
Act should allow the continued development of such guidelines, but must
also clearly indicate that these guidelines do not alter the boundaries of fair
use.
Part IV considers the use of alternative regimes that are layered on top of
the existing copyright structure. I focus here on the most prominent example
of such an approach—Creative Commons—a nonprofit organization that
provides standardized licensing contracts that alter the default restrictions of
copyright. In this Part, I suggest ways that formal law can facilitate the use of
such individualized approaches.
In Part V, I discuss the last major form of private ordering—the
increasing use of contracts and technology by content providers to limit user
rights far beyond what the law requires. Absent legislative intervention, these
private efforts may make fair use largely irrelevant to most consumers. To
counteract this effect, I recommend adding an express statutory provision
requiring that contracts related to the use of copyrighted works and
technology used for copyright enforcement must maintain a significant fair
use zone.
Finally, in Part VI, I suggest some preliminary ideas for possible changes
to the Copyright Act informed by copyright’s private ordering. Some
industry customs reveal areas of consensus that might merit greater stability
through codification, such as faculty ownership of course materials and
scholarship. Private ordering also highlights areas where the law generally
needs revision. For example, much of the private ordering is driven by the
unpredictability and expense of fair use litigation. A variety of reforms could
provide greater support to those who wish to use others’ copyrighted works
without permission in contexts that we would like to facilitate.
II.

THE CLEARANCE CULTURE AND THE ROLE OF
CUSTOMARY LICENSING PRACTICES

One dominant mode of private ordering in the copyright arena is the
pervasive licensing of copyrighted works even when such licensing is
unnecessary. In prior work, I have dubbed these practices of licensing or
removing almost all copyrighted works from new works “litigation-avoidance
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customs.”9 These litigation-avoidance customs form a “clearance culture” in
which the default approach is to clear everything without regard to whether
the uses would have otherwise been lawful.10
These clearance practices are firmly entrenched in all media, including
film, television, music, the fine arts, and publishing.11 Many book publishers,
movie and television studios, distributors, insurers, and other gatekeepers in
various copyright fields err on the side of licensing all third-party content.12 If
licensing is not feasible, they often demand the removal of third-party
material.13 Many of the intended uses would likely be fair ones if litigated (to
the extent one can accurately predict such things).14 Nevertheless, legal
counsel make reasonable calculations that in most instances it will be cheaper
and easier to license works than to risk uncertain and expensive litigation.
The current median cost of copyright litigation beyond the discovery stage
ranges from $300,000 to just under $1.625 million (depending on the amount
at risk).15
Not only does the cost of litigation itself often outweigh alternative
arrangements between parties, but the consequences of losing in court are
substantial. Even if no actual damages are caused by the use of a plaintiff’s
work, statutory damages for copyright cases can be massive.16 Additionally,
attorney’s fees can be awarded to the prevailing party, so a loss can mean
9. Rothman, supra note 7, at 1909–24, 1951–53. In other instances, licensing is driven
by “relationship-preservation” because the parties have ongoing relationships with the
owners of the relevant copyrighted works and do not wish to cause conflicts that will have
future ill effects on business dealings. Id. at 1949, 1951–53 (drawing on the work of Lisa
Bernstein in the context of contract law). I will focus here only on the prevalent litigationavoidance customs, though relationship-preserving licensing undoubtedly adds to the overall
clearance culture.
10. Rothman, supra note 7, at 1911–16; PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI,
UNTOLD STORIES: CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR
DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS 22 (2004), available at http://www.cmsimpact.org/
sites/default/files/UNTOLDSTORIES_Report.pdf (defining the “clearance culture” as
“the shared set of expectations that all rights must always be cleared”). Others have also
used this term. See, e.g., MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, WILL FAIR USE SURVIVE?
FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF COPYRIGHT CONTROL 5 (2005), available at
http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/WillFairUseSurvive.pdf; cf. LAWRENCE LESSIG,
FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN
CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY passim (2004) (comparing the current lock-down
culture with his ideal “free culture”).
11. See Rothman, supra note 7, at 1911–16.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2013,
at 36 (2013).
16. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012).
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paying legal fees that significantly exceed damages, statutory or otherwise.17
The threat of injunctive relief also looms large because if granted, such relief
can destroy the chance of recovering the initial investment in a project. This
risk is particularly great in the motion picture industry because the upfront
investment costs are substantial. Criminal liability also encourages parties to
err on the side of licensing, especially given that a breach of the dominant
licensing practices may expose a party to being found a willful infringer
subject to penalties that include prison time and additional fines.18
A.

FEAR OF GAMBLING ON FAIR USE

Much of the pressure to adopt these clearance practices derives from
uncertainty as to the boundaries of copyright’s fair use defense. The fair use
defense permits uses of another’s copyrighted work without permission or
payment in some circumstances. The fairness of a particular use is primarily
determined by considering four factors set forth in § 107 of the Copyright
Act.19 Section 107 provides that:
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by
reproduction in copies or phonorecords . . . for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of
a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include—(1) the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.20

The fair use doctrine can be difficult to apply in the real world. Average
citizens have trouble evaluating what uses they can make of others’ works
and even experienced copyright attorneys note the unpredictability of fair use
17. See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012).
18. See 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2012) (exposing those who willfully infringe copyrights for
commercial advantage to up to ten years in prison and additional financial penalties); Richard
Feiner & Co. v. Passport Int’l Prods., No. 97-Civ-9144(RO), 1998 WL 437157, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1998) (finding that copyright infringement was willful because the use of
unlicensed film clips contravened industry clearance practices); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2319
(2014) (setting forth additional criminal penalties for violation of 17 U.S.C. § 506).
19. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)
(setting forth the common law fair use doctrine).
20. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
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determinations. Scholars and courts have long described the fair use doctrine
as “murky,” “unpredictable” and “ad hoc.”21
Several recent works have challenged these dire assessments of fair use.22
Michael Madison, for example, has noted numerous “patterns” or categories
of preferred uses—ones more likely to be found fair.23 These categories
include journalism, parody, and criticism.24 According to Professor Madison,
if a user conforms to the practices of a particular pattern of use, the use is
likely to be found fair.25 Pamela Samuelson has similarly claimed that
“copyright fair use caselaw is more coherent and more predictable than many
commentators seem to believe.”26 Like Madison, Professor Samuelson
describes “clusters” of uses that are more likely to be held fair.27 Her
categories include expressive uses, such as transformative or productive ones
(e.g., parodies or critical commentaries), authorship-promoting uses, uses that
promote learning, and foreseeable uses (e.g., personal uses and uses in
litigation).28 Matthew Sag’s recent empirical analysis of fair use cases supports
Madison’s and Samuelson’s contention that fair use is more predictable than
is often claimed.29 Professor Sag points to the strong likelihood of succeeding
on a fair use defense when a use is transformative and copies only part of the
underlying work.30
Although I agree that there are broad categories and patterns of uses
more likely (or even likely) to be found fair, these broad assessments do not
provide sufficient security for users in individual cases. There is a big
difference between knowing that given categories of uses tend to be favored
for fair use—e.g., uses in news or education—and knowing how a particular
case will turn out. Moreover, in the gray areas (and even outside them) the
case law is littered with overturned assessments of fair use and cases that

21. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939); WILLIAM F.
PATRY, PATRY ON FAIR USE §§ 3:89, 9:33 (2d ed. 1995); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use
Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105–06 (1990); Lloyd Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on
the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1137–38 (1990).
22. Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47 (2012); Pamela Samuelson,
Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009); Michael J. Madison, A PatternOriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525 (2004).
23. See generally Madison, supra note 22.
24. Id. at 1645–64.
25. Id. at 1622–64.
26. Samuelson, supra note 22, at 2537.
27. Id. at 2541 & passim.
28. Id. at 2546–2614.
29. Sag, supra note 22, at 79–81
30. Id.
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point in different directions.31 Major content-industry players therefore
unsurprisingly often prefer to license, given the risks associated with asserting
a fair use claim, even when they know the use at issue falls into one of the
preferred categories.
The Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. case is emblematic of why litigating
fair use is not a preferred business model in the content industries.32 Campbell
is most often cited for its shift in focus in fair use determinations to the
question of transformativeness. This approach, which has been universally
adopted, adds a consideration to the first fair use factor that evaluates the
purpose and character of a defendant’s use. Courts now consider whether the
use changes or alters the original work to such an extent that the work is
“transformed.”33
Despite this dominant narrative of Campbell, the case is also an object
lesson on why parties prefer to license even if they think they could
eventually prevail on a fair use determination in the courts. Campbell involved
the claim that the song, Pretty Woman, by the rap group 2 Live Crew infringed
Oh, Pretty Woman, a song recorded and written by Roy Orbison. A district
court in Tennessee held 2 Live Crew’s use of Orbison’s song fair.34 The Sixth
Circuit, however, reversed, concluding that the use was not fair primarily
because it was commercial, took the heart of the underlying work, and likely
damaged the market for derivatives of the song.35 The Supreme Court
31. See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013), rev’g 784 F. Supp. 2d 337
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that many of the artist’s uses of defendant’s photographs were
fair); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001), rev’g 136
F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (holding that the novel The Wind Done Gone could be a fair
use of Margaret Mitchell’s Gone With the Wind ); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90
(2d Cir. 1987), rev’g 650 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that uses of excerpts and
paraphrases of J.D. Salinger’s letters in a biography about the famous author were not fair
use). Compare, e.g., Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, 126 F.3d 70, 80–81 (2d Cir. 1997)
(reversing the district court and rejecting a fair use defense when a poster appeared for less
than thirty seconds in the background of a scene in a television sitcom), with, e.g., Amsinck v.
Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that the use of a
copyrighted mobile in a film was fair even though it was sometimes shown in close-up and
appeared on screen for over one and a half minutes), and Gottlieb Dev. L.L.C. v. Paramount
Pics. Corp., 590 F. Supp. 2d 625 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that the use of a copyrighted
pinball machine in the background of a film was not infringing).
32. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
33. There is a consensus that after Campbell, fair use defenses became easier to win, at
least if one could show that the underlying work was sufficiently “transformed.” See Jennifer
E. Rothman, Sex Exceptionalism in Intellectual Property, 23 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 119, 149
(2012).
34. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1153–58 (M.D. Tenn.
1991) (finding fair use primarily on the basis that it was a parody that would not directly
injure the market for the original and that would have been unlikely to receive a license).
35. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1434–39 (6th Cir. 1992).
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granted certiorari on the fair use question and reversed the Sixth Circuit. The
Court held that the commerciality of the use was not dispositive and that the
lower courts should consider the transformativeness of the use in addition to
the song’s commercial status when evaluating the first fair use factor—the
purpose and character of the use.36
Although the use in Campbell is often referred to as a fair one and the
case as a “win” for the defendant, this is not true. The Supreme Court did
not end the fair use litigation with its decision, but instead remanded for
further fact finding on the market harm factor.37 The song had generated
significant revenue for Acuff-Rose (the holder of Orbison’s copyright) not
only from the initial recording, but also from the licensing of covers and
other derivative works. The district court was instructed to consider whether
the use by 2 Live Crew would harm these markets and then to weigh that
harm with the other fair use factors.
Two years after the Supreme Court decision the case settled without a final
determination of fair use. As part of the agreement, 2 Live Crew paid a licensing
fee to Acuff-Rose.38 Although the amount of the license is not public, there is
no question that it would have been cheaper to just pay a licensing fee at the
outset before the massive attorneys’ fees accrued.39 2 Live Crew’s victory was
a Pyrrhic one. Thus, rather than solidify future assertions of fair use, Campbell
reinforces the preference to license or remove material whenever possible.
Even if one had predicted, reasonably, at the outset that the use was fair, the
cost of litigating the case to the Supreme Court likely far exceeded the cost of
the license—if obtainable—and perhaps even the value to the defendant of
doing the parody in the first place. If the attorneys had known the path
Campbell would take, they might have suggested that the record label not
release the song.40
The path of Campbell is hardly an isolated instance of courts going back
and forth on fair use determinations. The case law is littered with such
examples. I will highlight two recent examples. In Cariou v. Prince, the Second
Circuit recently reversed (in part) the district court’s determination that the
uses of the plaintiff’s photographs in artworks by appropriation art
36. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578–79.
37. Id. at 593–94.
38. Acuff-Rose Settles Suit with Rap Group, MEMPHIS COMMERCIAL APPEAL, June 5, 1996,
at A14.
39. Cf. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 802 (6th Cir. 2005)
(noting that it is “cheaper to license than to litigate” fair use).
40. This possible trajectory was not entirely lost on the record label, which had initially
sought a license for the Orbison song, but was denied one by Acuff-Rose. Campbell, 510 U.S.
at 572–73.
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phenomenon Richard Prince were infringing. The Second Circuit held most
of the uses fair because they were transformative.41 Notably, the court agreed
with the district court with regard to at least five of the photographs,
concluding that these were not sufficiently transformative to hold the uses
fair as a matter of law.42 The court remanded the case back to the district
court for an evaluation of fair use on these allegedly infringing artworks.43
Like Campbell, the case then settled.44 Each party paid their own (likely
substantial) attorneys’ fees.45 It is not clear whether Prince paid a licensing
fee, because the terms of the agreement to settle have not been disclosed.46
A similar litigation history can be seen in the Margaret Mitchell estate’s
efforts to stop Alice Randall’s unauthorized alternative version of Gone with
the Wind, told from the slaves’ point of view. Randall’s The Wind Done Gone
was held infringing by a district court. The Eleventh Circuit then reversed
and held that the use’s transformativeness weighed in favor of fair use.47 As
in Campbell and Cariou, the appeal did not end the fair use litigation; instead,
the case was remanded for further fact-finding.48 Randall’s publisher,
Houghton Mifflin, then settled the case and agreed to pay a licensing fee to
the Mitchell estate for the use—with the caveat that the fee would go to
Morehouse College rather than directly to the Mitchell estate. The publisher
also agreed to clearly label Randall’s book as an “unauthorized parody.”49
Given these commonplace reversals, conflicting decisions on similar
uses, and the reality that many of these so-called victories for fair use were in
fact resolved by paying licensing fees and substantial attorneys’ fees, it
remains a smart business decision to license whenever possible. Even though
fair use may be more predictable (and generous) than some have feared, it
still does not provide sufficient reliability, predictability, or efficiency to
incentivize assertions of fair use. The dominant clearance culture therefore
largely remains in place.50

41. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705–12 (2d Cir. 2013).
42. Id. at 710–11.
43. Id. at 712.
44. Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal, Cariou v. Prince, No. 08-CIV.11327, at *1 (filed
on March 19, 2014).
45. Id.
46. Jan Wolfe, Cariou, Viacom Copyright Suits Settlements, 30 ENT. LAW & FIN.
NEWSLETTER (ALM Media Props., New York, N.Y.), Apr. 1, 2014, at 5.
47. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
48. Id. at 1275–77.
49. David Mehegan, Settlement Lets ‘Gone With the Wind’ Parody Live On, BOSTON
GLOBE, May 10, 2002, at C4.
50. Rothman, supra note 7, at 1911–16; Jennifer E. Rothman, Best Intentions: Reconsidering
Best Practices Statements in the Context of Fair Use and Copyright Law, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 371,
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JUDICIAL RELIANCE ON LITIGATION-AVOIDANCE CUSTOMS

These individual risk-averse decisions to license or remove material
negatively affect what sorts of creative works get made and their content. In
the context of potential revisions to copyright law, the bigger concern is not
the societal losses caused by these individual creative alterations, but instead
courts’ willingness to consider such practices as evidence of what sorts of
uses are fair. In numerous instances, courts have looked at clearance-culture
licensing practices as evidence that a particular use is unfair because it
contravenes the industry custom to license those types of uses.
Courts consider both actual and potential licensing markets when
evaluating two of the fair use factors. The first fair use factor considers the
“purpose and character of the use.”51 As part of this inquiry, courts
determine whether a use is commercial in nature. The failure to license a
work when it is customary to do so has been viewed as evidence that a use is
commercial in nature—a determination that weighs against fair use.
The consideration of licensing practices to determine if a use is
commercial stems in large part from the Supreme Court’s decision in Harper
& Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, Inc.52 In Harper & Row, the Court
explained that: “The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether
the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to
profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the
customary price.”53 The customary price is determined by what others are
paying to use a work. The tendency to license works to avoid litigation costs
and the unpredictability of fair use establishes a “customary price.” When a
defendant is found to have not paid this “customary price,” the defendant’s
use is often held unfair.54
375 (2010). In Section III.B, I discuss some successes in pushing back against these
practices.
51. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
52. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., Inc., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
53. Id. at 562 (citing Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 503
F. Supp. 1137, 1144 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A][1] (1984)) (emphasis added).
54. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801–02, 804 n.19
(6th Cir. 2005) (questioning the availability of a fair use defense for the unlicensed sampling
of another’s song in an industry where most companies and artists “sought licenses as a
matter of course”); Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 166–68, 176 (2d Cir. 2001) (rejecting
the fair use defense for incidental display of sunglasses in advertisement when the defendant
failed to pay the customary price for use of a copyrighted design); Ringgold v. Black Entm’t
Television, 126 F.3d 70, 80–81 (2d Cir. 1997) (rejecting the fair use defense when the
defendant did not follow industry custom of clearing background scenery used in a television
show); Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1385–88 (6th Cir.
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Courts also consider licensing practices when analyzing the fourth fair
use factor. This factor evaluates the effect of the use on the market for the
work or the work’s underlying value.55 When there is a general industry
practice to license copyrighted works in a particular context and a defendant
fails to do so, courts point to the existence of an overall licensing market as
evidence that a defendant’s failure to license causes or will cause market
harm.56 Taken together, these litigation-avoidance customs, driven by
reasonable business calculations, have a multiplier effect that makes it
difficult to successfully assert a fair use defense when risk-averse licensing is
common.
One of the clearest examples of courts’ reliance on customary licensing
practices is the Second Circuit’s decision in Ringgold v. Black Entertainment
Television.57 In Ringgold, Black Entertainment Television (“BET”) used a poster
of the plaintiff’s artwork in the background set-dressing of its television
sitcom, ROC. BET was assumed to have lawfully purchased the poster after
deciding that it would be an appropriate piece of art for the scene.58 The
poster was visible for less than thirty seconds, was never the focal point of
1996) (rejecting the fair use defense when the defendant did not follow the industry custom
of licensing coursepack materials); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913,
926–27, 930–31 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting the fair use defense when a private corporation did
not follow the industry practice of licensing); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Marvel
Enters., 155 F. Supp. 2d 1, 47–48 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (rejecting the fair use defense when the
defendants failed to license footage used in a promotional clip in contravention of the
industry practice to license such clips); Richard Feiner & Co., Inc. v. Passport Int’l Prods.,
Inc., No. 97 Civ. 9144(RO), 1998 WL 437157, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1998) (finding
defendants’ failure to license film trailers reckless because “defendants are not amateurs in
video production” and it was film “industry practice to license trailers for exhibition”); cf.
Triangle Publ’ns v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 626 F.2d 1171, 1176 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding
that the use of plaintiff’s copyrighted magazine cover was fair use, in part because the
advertising industry routinely follows a practice of using copyrighted works in comparative
ads); Frank Schaffer Publ’ns v. The Lyons P’ship, L.P., 10 Ent. L. Rep. 9, 13 (C.D. Cal.
1993) (holding that use was fair where no license was sought, in part because the “customary
price for the inclusion of [the plaintiff’s posters in the defendant’s show’s set] is gratis”).
55. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
56. See, e.g., Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens, Ltd., 619 F.3d 301, 308–13 (4th Cir. 2010);
Davis, 246 F.3d at 166–68, 176; L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d
987, 994–95 (9th Cir. 1998); L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119, 1122–
23 (9th Cir. 1997); Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 80–81; Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1385–86; Am.
Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 926–27; Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311–12 (2d Cir. 1992);
Amsinck v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. 862 F. Supp. 1044, 1048–49 (S.D.N.Y. 1994);
Frank Schaffer Publ’ns v. The Lyons P’ship, L.P., 15 Ent. L. Rep. 9 (C.D. Cal. 1993); Basic
Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1532 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
57. Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997) (reversing a district
court decision that the use was fair).
58. Id. at 71–72. The network itself likely did not concern itself with the poster, but the
production designer or set dresser likely chose it on behalf of the production.
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any shot, and was not referred to in the dialogue.59 Nevertheless, the court
rejected a fair use defense in large part because of the failure to conform with
the industry practice of licensing copyrighted works used as set-dressing.60
The court concluded that BET failed to pay the “customary price” for using
Ringgold’s work because it did not license her artwork.61 In so holding, the
Second Circuit reversed the district court’s finding of fair use.
Not only do such fair use decisions problematically reject the defense in
instances in which it should be found, but they also further skew licensing
practices and exacerbate the under-assertion of fair use. When courts
consider licensing evidence, parties are more likely to license, which makes
courts more likely to once again rely on licensing evidence.62 The end result is
doctrinal feedback which exacerbates the incorporation of these risk-averse,
but customary practices.63 Small acts of litigation-avoidance can lead to a
cascade of risk-averse practices that ultimately set the fair use standard
without courts ever engaging in an independent fair use analysis.
A prime example of this is the licensing practices that developed in
response to the settlement of a complaint filed against New York University
(“NYU”) involving the copying of works for educational uses. The lawsuit by
publishers against the university alleged that the copying of works for use in
classroom materials infringed various copyrights. Rather than litigate the

59. Id. at 72–74.
60. Id. at 79–80. The court cited an amicus brief filed by the Artists Rights Society and
the Picasso estate that listed numerous examples of other shows and films that licensed
artwork in similar circumstances. See id.; see also Brief for Artists Rights Society as Amici
Curiae, Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997) (No. 96-9329).
61. Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 81 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985)).
62. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1397 (6th Cir.
1996) (Merritt, J., dissenting); id. at 1400–04, 1407–10 (Ryan, J., dissenting); Am.
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929 n.17, 931 (2d Cir. 1994); id. at 936–39
(Jacobs, J., dissenting); Hofheinz v. A&E Television Networks, 146 F. Supp. 2d. 442,
448–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Hofheinz v. AMC Prods., Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 127, 140
(E.D.N.Y. 2001); Rothman, supra note 7, at 1933–34; James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights
Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 885–906 (2007); Lydia Pallas Loren,
Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 38–47 (1997); Matthew Africa, Comment, The Misuse of Licensing Evidence
in Fair Use Analysis: New Technologies, New Markets, and the Courts, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1145,
1145–64 (2000).
63. Gibson, supra note 62, at 884–86 & passim; cf. Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and
Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1717–18 (1996); Sushil Bikhchandani et al., A
Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON.
992, 994 (1992); Abhiji V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q.J. ECON. 797, 798
(1992).
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case, NYU settled.64 This settlement led many other universities and copy
stores to license material used in course readers and handouts, even though
there was no governing case law on these uses.65 When the less risk-averse
entities then claimed the uses were fair, courts cited the licensing that
followed the NYU settlement as a basis for denying fair use defenses in
similar contexts. In the first court decision to litigate the fair use question,
Basic Books v. Kinko’s, a court held that it was not a fair use to copy articles
and other materials for the classroom in part because of the customary
practice of licensing such uses.66 After this single court decision on the issue,
most holdouts started licensing materials.67 When subsequent challenges were
made to the fair use evaluation in Basic Books, courts pointed again to the
now-even-more-prevalent licensing practices as a basis for rejecting a fair use
defense in the context of course packets.68 It may be appropriate to license
articles and other materials routinely used in an educational context,69
particularly if the educational market is the primary market for the underlying
work, but the fact that such licensing is customary should have little
relevance for determining fair use. I will discuss the appropriate role for
evidence of licensing in the next section.
C.

DISRUPTING THE CLEARANCE CULTURE

Any revision to the Copyright Act must address the courts’ reliance on
litigation-avoidance licensing customs. Even though not all courts have gone
down this problematic path, enough have that this line of cases must be
overruled by statute. The Copyright Act should clarify that such industry
64. Addison-Wesley Publ’g Co. v. N.Y. Univ., No. 82 Civ. 8333, 1983 WL 1134, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1983).
65. See Steven J. Melamut, Pursuing Fair Use, Law Libraries and Electronic Reserves, 92 LAW
LIBR. J. 157, 182 (2000); Bernard Zidar, Fair Use and the Code of the Schoolyard: Can Copyshops
Compile Coursepacks Consistent with Copyright?, 46 EMORY L.J. 1363, 1377 (1997) (citing
KENNETH D. CREWS, COPYRIGHT, FAIR USE, AND THE CHALLENGE FOR UNIVERSITIES 45
(1993)).
66. Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
67. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1384 (6th Cir.
1996); Rothman, supra note 7, at 1920–21, 1954–55.
68. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1384–88 (pointing to dominant licensing
practices in fair use analysis to find commercial purpose and likely market harm); cf.
Addison-Wesley Publ’g Co. v. N.Y. Univ., No. 82 Civ. 8333, 1983 WL 1134 (S.D.N.Y. May
31, 1983) (Order and Final Judgment) (providing the terms of the NYU settlement).
69. Cf. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga. 2012)
(holding some educational uses not fair because of available licensing), rev’d on other grounds,
Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014). After the substantive
editing of this Article was complete, the Eleventh Circuit issued its opinion in Patton. The
appellate decision agreed with the relevance of available licensing markets in the educational
context. See id. at 1275–81.
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clearance practices should be discounted. Given the strong impetus to
remove uncleared works or license works regardless of the likely viability or
appropriateness of a fair use defense, the mere existence of such practices
provides limited information about the fairness of the particular use. The fact
that licensing markets exist should not weigh against fair use simply because
licensing is common practice.
Some scholars do not share my concerns about using customary licensing
as a proxy for fair use. In particular, Richard Epstein, while acknowledging
many areas of agreement with my analysis, suggests that common licensing
practices may be indicative of appropriate fair use boundaries.70 Although he
thinks bullying by copyright holders and the ensuing litigation avoidance by
“frightened” users should not be considered in fair use analysis, he contends
that most other clearance-culture practices are more deserving of deference.71
In the context of Ringgold, for example, he thinks that the customary licensing
may reflect the appropriateness of licensing background artwork.72 For him,
the workability of such a licensing regime suggests that the markets may be
working well in this regard because these practices may allow parties to
access works for use in scenes (at reasonable rates), while at the same time
facilitating payments to creators for uses of their works.73
This apparent win-win, however, frames fair use primarily through a
market failure lens.74 Some have suggested that if licensing is possible, all
works should be licensed.75 However, fair use has never been, and should
never be, “fared use.”76 Courts do not require a defendant to demonstrate
that a plaintiff would not have been willing to license at a reasonable fee
before finding a fair use. Nor should a custom of not licensing such works
definitively establish the contrary—that such uses are fair. Fair use means
70. Richard A. Epstein, Some Reflection on Custom in the IP Universe, 93 VA. L. REV. BRIEF
223 (2008) (responding to my work).
71. Id. at 224–25.
72. Id. at 225–27.
73. Id.
74. For a fuller response to Richard Epstein, see Jennifer E. Rothman, Why Custom
Cannot Save Copyright’s Fair Use Defense, 93 VA. L. REV. BRIEF 243 (2008).
75. See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 188–216 (2003); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A
Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600,
1614 & passim (1982) (advocating a test for fair use that requires a demonstration of “market
failure”). I note that Professor Gordon in other work has suggested that copyright should be
limited either in scope or by the First Amendment in ways that exceed this market failure
analysis. See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in
the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993).
76. Jennifer E. Rothman, Liberating Copyright: Thinking Beyond Free Speech, 95 CORNELL L.
REV. 463, 569 (2010).
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more than simple market failure.77 Regardless of whether reasonable licensing
rates are available, not all uses of another’s copyrighted works should be by
permission or payment only. If in every instance where a license could be
purchased, but is not, a court concludes that the “customary price” is not
paid, and rejects a fair use, fair use will be dramatically narrowed.
Consider the fact that individual songs can now be purchased on iTunes
and other services for ninety-nine cents. If this fee is considered the
customary price, because people customarily pay the ninety-nine cents, then
are all uses of songs without paying this fee unfair? Under the customaryprice language, yes—even if a song is exchanged among close friends or
family, used as background music for a classroom project, or displayed in
slides by a copyright professor making a point. Even if there were a
mechanism for easily paying for a license for such uses at reasonable rates, it
is not appropriate to require payment in each of these instances. Consider a
use in a slightly different context. Suppose that a documentary filmmaker
wishes to include (without blurring the image or text) a poster of the hit boy
band One Direction that one of his subjects has up on her bedroom wall.
Why should One Direction or the holder of the copyright in the image
receive any compensation for the appearance of posters that were lawfully
purchased and actually hung in the documentary subject’s room? Even if the
filmmaker could obtain a reasonably priced license to display the poster in
her movie, he should not have to ask anyone’s permission or pay any fee to
document his subject’s reality. There are many instances in which the
freedom of expression and association, and the rights of privacy and liberty
demand that uses be permissible regardless of the functioning of licensing
markets.78
The foregoing analysis does not mean that evidence about licensing is
wholly irrelevant. The availability and ease of licensing is a relevant and
useful inquiry in fair use. Evidence of frequent licensing can demonstrate the
feasibility of licensing in a particular context and weigh against a finding of
fair use. The key question, however, should be whether there is a reasonable
and appropriate mechanism for obtaining the copyrighted work at a
reasonable price in the required form, not the frequency (or infrequency) of
licensing.

77. See id. at 528–29, 532–33.
78. For a more in-depth discussion of some of these uses, see generally Rothman, supra
note 76, in which I describe uses that should be protected under a liberty-based analysis.
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This distinction is highlighted in the recent Cambridge Press v. Becker
district-court decision.79 In Becker, the court evaluated a fair use defense by
Georgia State University for electronically copying and distributing works (or
parts of those works) for use in online reserves accessible to students.80 The
court held that the fair use determination depended in large part on whether
there was an easy way of getting an electronic copy of the required article or
book chapter at a reasonable fee.81 When digital formats were available at
reasonable prices, the court concluded that the uses were less likely to be fair.
In contrast, when no electronic copies were available or were offered only at
unreasonable fees, a finding of fair use was much more likely.82 Although I
do not think the availability (or lack thereof) of such licensing should be
dispositive of fair use, it certainly is relevant. Market failure can be an
appropriate basis on which to find fair use (or perhaps craft a reasonable,
compulsory licensing fee),83 but the absence of market failure should not bar
a fair use defense.
My focus here, however, is not on when licensing markets should be
considered, but when they should not be considered in fair use analysis. The
clearance culture described above and courts’ reliance on such licensing
practices have contracted the scope of fair use in concerning ways. One
possible way to address this overreliance on risk-averse licensing practices is
to codify an explicit rejection of cases like Ringgold. The fair use provision
could explicitly state that the commonness of licensing should not determine
commerciality or likely market harm. For example: “Evidence of whether
licensing is customary in a particular context should not be considered.”
Given the discussion of other aspects of private ordering in this article, it
might be useful to have a broader provision that would list a series of
disfavored considerations in the fair use context.84 Additional language could

79. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga. 2012), rev’d on
other grounds, Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014). After the
substantive editing of this Article was complete, the Eleventh Circuit issued its opinion in
Patton. The appellate decision largely agreed with the market failure analysis of the district
court. See id. at 1275–81.
80. Id. at 1201.
81. Id. at passim.
82. Id.
83. I am open to Jane Ginsburg’s thoughtful idea to shift, in some limited instances,
some fair use from an on/off switch to a “permitted, but paid” regime. See Jane C. Ginsburg,
Fair Use for Free, or Permitted-but-Paid?, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1383 (2014). However, I am
not convinced that only “new works” should benefit from “(free) fair use,” nor that all “new
works” should escape payment. Also, the boundaries of what constitutes a new work may be
challenging to delineate.
84. See discussion infra Section VI.A.
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clarify that the existence of a feasible and reasonably priced licensing market
may nevertheless be considered as one among several considerations.
Changing the effect of customary licensing practices on fair use
evaluations will provide an important and positive pushback against the
dominant clearance culture. Parties will not have to license just because
everyone else is doing it. Instead, they will only need to license when they
otherwise think the use is not fair. The uncertainty of fair use may still drive
some risk-averse licensing, but the feedback loop created by such licensing
will be disrupted. Making fair use more predictable, adding safe harbors, and
limiting the scope of statutory damages, as I discuss in Part VI, will also
encourage assertions of fair use and more frequent and positive engagement
with copyrighted works.
III.

THE PROLIFERATION OF USE GUIDELINES

In response to some of the uncertain areas of fair use and the clearance
culture that has followed, a variety of private agreements and guidelines have
been developed to set forth either safe zones of uses or parameters for
compliance with fair use in particular arenas. There is a wide range of such
“agreements,” “guidelines,” “statements,” and “codes.”85 In some instances,
companies set forth their own internal guidelines to facilitate corporate
compliance with copyright law.86 Industries and trade groups have also
sought to insulate themselves from liability by agreeing in a more formal
manner to a set of standard copying practices.87 Sometimes these guidelines
or agreements have developed with a broad base of parties, but more
frequently only a few parties (often with common views) agree on what they
think are appropriate uses of others’ copyrighted works. Unsurprisingly,
owner-dominated groups have largely set forth restrictive guidelines and
user-dominated groups mostly more permissive ones.
I will focus on two primary examples of such guidelines. The first is the
Classroom Guidelines that were explicitly commissioned by Congress to
provide guidance in the educational context. Members of Congress could not
agree on statutory language to address the use of copyrighted works in the
85. See Rothman, supra note 7, at 1916–24.
86. Id. at 1922.
87. See, e.g., Robert S. Bray, Photocopying and Copyright: A Progress Report, 48 SPECIAL
LIBRARIES 100, 101–03 (1957) (Chairman of Photographic Reproduction Committee urging
adoption of policy regarding library photocopying to avoid an “unfavorable incident” in
which publishers sue); Excerpts of Record at 696–97, Roy Export Co. Establishment of
Vaduz v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1981) (Nos. 81-7027, 7109)
(Testimony of Eaton); Heins & Beckles, supra note 10, at 20–21; Williams & Wilkins Co. v.
United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
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classroom, so they punted the issue to private parties to resolve. The second
example is a series of best practices “statements” and “codes” put out by
American University’s Center for Social Media. These statements claim to set
forth guidelines (and a preferred approach) for evaluating fair use in different
contexts in communities that frequently rely on the use of others’
copyrighted works. I will discuss each of these guidelines in turn.
A.

THE CLASSROOM GUIDELINES

The most influential of the non-statutory copyright guidelines is the
“Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-For-Profit
Educational Institutions,” commonly referred to as the “Classroom
Guidelines.” While drafting the fair use section of the 1976 Copyright Act,
Congress recruited industry representatives, in particular publishers, to
develop their own guidelines for what constituted fair use of writings and
music in educational settings.88 The chairman and other members of the
subcommittee working on the copyright revision “urged the parties to meet
together independently in an effort to achieve a meeting of the minds as to
permissible educational uses of copyrighted material.”89 Congress contended
that “workable voluntary arrangements” were the preferable solution to
questions regarding the scope of fair use, at least in the context of
educational uses.90 Unfortunately, the Classroom Guidelines were developed
and negotiated primarily by large publishers and a few author organizations;
educators, universities, and scholars were only minimally represented and
students were entirely voiceless in the process.91 No educator or university
organization was a signatory to the Guidelines.92 The American Association
of University Professors and the American Association of Law Schools
actively opposed the guidelines.93
In light of this history, these guidelines unsurprisingly take a narrow view
of what sort of uses of copyrighted works are permissible in the educational
88. The Author-Publisher Group, Author’s League, Association of American
Publishers, Inc., and the Chairman of the Copyright Committee signed the resulting
agreement on Classroom Guidelines. AGREEMENT ON GUIDELINES FOR CLASSROOM
COPYING IN NOT-FOR-PROFIT EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS WITH RESPECT TO BOOKS
AND PERIODICALS, H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 68–70 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5681– 83.
89. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 67, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5680.
90. H.R. REP. NO. 90-83, at 33, 36 (1967); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 67–68, reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5680–82.
91. See Rothman, supra note 7, at 1918–19.
92. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 72, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5685. See also Basic
Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1535 n.10 (describing Peter
Jaszi’s testimony that the guidelines were forced on educators).
93. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 72, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5685.

2014]

COPYRIGHT’S PRIVATE ORDERING

1615

context. The Guidelines provide that single copies of the following items may
be made for or by teachers for use in teaching or research: “a chapter from a
book, an article from a periodical or newspaper, a short story, short essay or
short poem and a chart, graph, diagram, drawing, cartoon or picture from a
book, periodical or newspaper.”94 Multiple copies, not exceeding one copy
per enrolled student, are permitted under more limited circumstances where
such uses are deemed to meet tests for brevity, spontaneity, and cumulative
effect.95 Brevity is defined as less than 250 words of a poem and a range of
500–2500 words of a prose work depending on its nature.96 The copies must
also include a notice of copyright.97
Although the Guidelines purport to set forth the minimum allowable
uses, many universities, other educational institutions, and libraries have
followed them as if they represent the maximum allowable uses.98 Many
universities have handed out the Guidelines to their professors and mandated
conformity with them.99 The Berkman Center for Internet & Society has
estimated that 80% of American universities comply with the Guidelines.100
Some universities will only defend professors against copyright infringement
actions if they conform to the Guidelines, or if they act with the express

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 68, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5682.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECH. USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF
COPYRIGHTED WORKS 52 (1979) (treating Guidelines as if they provided binding rules for
educational uses and suggesting without support that educators participated in development
of guidelines).
99. See, e.g., ACADEMIC PLANNING PROGRAMS AND COORDINATION, UNIV. OF CAL.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, UNIV. OF CAL. POLICY: REPRODUCTION OF COPYRIGHTED
MATERIALS FOR TEACHING AND RESEARCH (1986), available at http://policy.ucop.edu/
doc/2100007/ReproCopyrightMaterial [hereinafter U.C. Policy]; ROBERT C. ELLICKSON,
ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 259 n.73 (1991) (describing
Stanford University practice in the 1980s).
100. William W. Fisher & William McGeveran, The Digital Learning Challenge: Obstacles to
Educational Uses of Copyrighted Material in the Digital Age, BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET &
SOC’Y 57 (Aug. 10, 2006), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/home/2006-09. The
Classroom Guidelines are not the only copyright guidelines routinely followed. Similar Music
Guidelines were developed to govern the use of musical works in classrooms. Many libraries
also conform to the guidelines issued by CONTU (Commission on New Technological Uses
of Copyrighted Works) governing Photocopying Under Interlibrary Loan Arrangements.
CONTU Guidelines, supra note 98 (limiting photocopies to 5 articles per periodical title per
year).
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approval of university counsel.101 Some universities go even further than the
Guidelines and require that all material circulated in the classroom be
accompanied by release forms or be purchased.102 More recently, a few
universities have bucked this trend. The University of Minnesota has chosen
to defend professors if they reasonably believe fair use applies even if the use
exceeds the Classroom Guidelines.103 At the beginning of 2014, NYU
withdrew its requirement that faculty comply with the Classroom Guidelines
and the school now allows its faculty to conduct a fair use analysis in
conjunction with the library staff and legal counsel.104
Courts have often (though not universally) viewed copying exceeding the
Guidelines as unfair even though the Guidelines are not legally binding.105 In
Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp.,106 for example, Kinko’s infringement
was viewed as bad faith in part because Kinko’s in-house handbook noted
that its copying practices exceeded the standards of the Classroom

101. See, e.g., U.C. Policy, supra note 99; FIN. AND ADMIN. POLICIES & PROCEDURES,
UNIV. OF VA., COPYING OF COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL (1987), available at
http://www.virginia.edu/polproc/pol/xvf1.html [hereinafter Virginia Policy].
102. See, e.g., Virginia Policy, supra note 101.
103. See UNIV. OF MINN. PAGE FOR INSTRUCTORS, https://www.lib.umn
.edu/copyright/university-minnesota-instructors/ (last visited June 9, 2014).
104. Compare N.Y. UNIV., OFFICE OF THE PROVOST, STATEMENT OF POLICY AND
GUIDELINES ON EDUCATIONAL AND RESEARCH USES OF COPYRIGHTED MATERIALS
(2014), available at http://www.nyu.edu/content/dam/nyu/compliance/documents/
CopyrightedMaterials.1.6.14.pdf [hereinafter 2014 NYU Policy] with N.Y. UNIV., UNIVERSITY
POLICY ON PHOTOCOPYING COPYRIGHTED MATERIALS (1983), available at http://www.
nyu.edu/content/dam/nyu/compliance/documents/photocopying.pdf [hereinafter 1983
NYU Policy] (requiring compliance with Classroom Guidelines and withdrawing the
university’s indemnification for failure to comply without express approval of counsel).
105. H.R REP. NO. 94-1476, at 68, 70–71 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5682–85
(noting that the Classroom Guidelines are not legally binding and are “not intended to limit
the types of copying permitted under the standards of fair use under judicial decision”).
Examples of courts that have relied on the Classroom Guidelines in fair use determinations
include: Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1390–91 (6th Cir. 1996)
(rejecting fair use defense in part because preparation of course packets exceeded
Guidelines); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 919, 919 n.5 (2d Cir. 1994)
(rejecting fair use defense when private-sector copying exceeded Guidelines); Marcus v.
Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 1983) (rejecting fair use defense because copying
for class materials exceeded Guidelines); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F.
Supp. 1522, 1530, 1535–37 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding preparation of course packets not a fair
use because violated Guideline’s prohibition on anthologies). But see Cambridge Univ. Press
v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1227–29 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (rejecting argument that the uses
of copyrighted works were not fair because they exceeded the Guidelines), rev’d on other
grounds, Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1283 (11th Cir. 2014) (agreeing
with district court’s rejection of the Guidelines).
106. Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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Guidelines.107 Thus, these guidelines that were intended to state a minimum
floor of allowable uses have frequently set the ceiling on educational uses.
B.

BEST-PRACTICES STATEMENTS AND CODES OF FAIR USE

Various use communities, in an effort to encourage and support greater
assertion of fair use rights to counteract the dominant clearance culture, have
recently begun to develop their own informal guidelines for fair use. In
contrast to the Classroom Guidelines, these guidelines seek to encourage,
rather than to limit, the use of copyrighted works. The most prominent
example of such an approach is the Best Practices Statements and Codes
produced by American University’s Center for Social Media. These
statements have been helpful in a number of ways, providing guidance to
those who are lost in the fair use thicket (particularly documentary
filmmakers) and ideally helping to insulate them against findings of willful
infringement.108 Many of these statements and codes were preceded by
reports that usefully documented the fair use needs of particular
communities.109
The Documentary Filmmakers’ Statement of Best Practices (hereinafter
“Filmmakers’ Statement ”) is the oldest and most well known of these
statements. It sets forth four categories of uses of others’ copyrighted works
that are likely fair in the context of documentary films. The privileged
categories are critique or commentary, illustrative quoting, incidental uses
(i.e., captured during the filming process), and uses in historical sequences.110
Each of these categories contains a number of “limitations.” Such limitations
include, for example, in the context of the category approving the use of
“copyrighted works of popular culture to illustrate an argument or point,” a
suggestion that documentarians should “assure that the material is properly
attributed . . . [; that] quotations are drawn from a range of different sources[;
that] each quotation . . . is no longer than is necessary to achieve the intended
107. Id. at 1535–37, 1544–45 (holding that there was a willful infringement in the
context of a violation of the classroom guidelines).
108. See Rothman, supra note 50, passim (providing a detailed discussion of the value and
pitfalls of these statements).
109. See, e.g., Patricia Aufderheide & Peter Jaszi, THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE
CONFUSING: USER-GENERATED VIDEO CREATORS ON COPYRIGHT (2007), available at
http://www.cmsimpact.org/sites/default/files/good_bad_confusing.pdf; Patricia Aufderheide
& Peter Jaszi, UNTOLD STORIES: CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE
CULTURE FOR DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS 22 (2004), available at http://www.
cmsimpact.org/sites/default/files/ UNTOLDSTORIES_Report.pdf.
110. CENTER FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, DOCUMENTARY
FILMMAKERS’ STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE 4–5 (2005), available at
http://www.cmsimpact.org/fair use/best-practices/documentary/documentary-filmmakersstatement-best-practices-fair use [hereinafter Filmmakers’ Statement].
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effect; [and that] the quoted material is not employed merely in order to
avoid the cost or inconvenience of shooting equivalent footage.”111
Another example of such guidelines is the Code of Best Practices in Fair Use
for OpenCourseWare (hereinafter “OpenCourseWare Code”). The OpenCourseWare
Code provides five categories of uses favored for fair use. Three of the five
categories overlap with those set forth in the Filmmakers’ Statement: incidental
uses, uses for critique and analysis, and illustrative uses. Two additional
categories are then added that favor demonstrative or explanatory uses, and
“assigned and supplementary materials.”112 Once again each category contains
a number of significant limitations. The category of uses of copyrighted
works for demonstrative or explanatory uses, for example, is limited to
circumstances when the use is not “cumulative,” there is “[n]o ready
substitute [available] (including one that the instructor himself or herself
could create with reasonable effort),” the extent of the use is appropriate, and
attribution is provided where “reasonably possible.”113
The Filmmakers’ Statement, which was published in 2005, has had a
positive effect in combating the clearance culture described in Part II.114
After its adoption, various film industry gatekeepers, such as Errors &
Omissions (“E & O”) insurers and production companies, reconsidered their
policies and became more willing to insure, produce, and distribute
documentary films that had not licensed all copyrighted material included
within the films.115 If a filmmaker claimed that the uses were fair and that he
111. Id.
112. CENTER FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, CODE OF BEST PRACTICES
IN FAIR USE FOR OPENCOURSEWARE 10–14 (2009), available at http://www.cmsimpact.org/
ocw/ [hereinafter OpenCourseWare Code].
113. Id. at 13–14.
114. The Filmmakers’ Statement has not been as successful with bigger players in the
industry or in the movie industry outside of documentary filmmaking. Many distributors still
demand clearance, and the overall film and television communities remain very much at the
heart of the clearance culture. Nor has compliance with the best practices statements
stopped copyright holders from suing if they do not think a use is fair. See, e.g., Aguiar v.
Webb, No. 1:07CV1167371-2 (D. Mass.). In Aguiar, the plaintiff filed and pursued a
copyright infringement suit despite the claim by the defendant that he had complied with the
Filmmakers’ Statement. See Amended Complaint, Aguiar v. Webb, No. 1:07CV1167371-2 (D.
Mass.) (filed on March 24, 2008); Answer to Restatement of Counterclaim, Aguiar v. Webb,
No. 1:07CV1167371-2 (D. Mass.) (filed May 23, 2008). The case was eventually settled. Joint
Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice, Aguiar v. Webb, No. 1:07CV1167371-2 (D. Mass.)
(May 3, 2010).
115. Patricia Aufderheide & Peter Jaszi, Fair Use and Best Practices: Surprising Success,
INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Oct. 2007, at a. A number of other factors also likely contributed to
a move away from the clearance culture, at least in the context of documentary films. In part,
the public relations drive surrounding the Filmmakers’ Statement’s release may have been more
effective than the statement itself. The development of legal clinics to support filmmakers if
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or she had complied with the terms of the Filmmakers’ Statement, then E & O
insurers became willing to issue insurance.116 Distributors and producers also
became more willing to rely on fair use rather than to require by rote that all
uses be licensed ones.117 Shortly after the release of the Filmmakers’ Statement, a
number of filmmakers were able to release films at the Sundance Film
Festival that had been threatened with removal from the program because of
clearance problems.118 Notably, Kirby Dick’s film, THIS FILM IS NOT YET
RATED, which used more than one hundred unlicensed movie clips, was
screened and subsequently distributed theatrically and on home video.119 PBS
and the Independent Film Channel have relied on the Filmmakers’ Statement to
develop their own internal standards and practices.120
In addition to the successful push to increase assertions of fair use, there
are many other potential benefits of these statements. The broad categories
of uses (such as illustrative, incidental, historical, and critical), as well as some
of the limitations (e.g., not using more than is necessary to make the relevant
point) track current fair use law, are normatively appropriate, and provide
clear guidance to non-lawyers.
Nevertheless, there are reasons to discourage the wholesale codification
of these statements and codes, as well as their treatment by courts as setting
the standard for fair use in a particular arena. First, like the Classroom
Guidelines, the drafters of the best practices statements have thus far not
included a particularly representative group of parties whose interests are
affected by the particular uses. None of the best practices statements that I
have reviewed has included representation of content providers whose work
is most likely to be used. The Filmmakers’ Statement, for example, did not
bring into the process the parties whose works were most likely to be
included in the documentaries. For example, no major movie studios or
record companies were approached or included.121 Although I agree with the
they are sued has also been crucial, as has Stanford University’s offer to insure any
documentary filmmaker who could not obtain insurance but who had viable fair use claims.
See Colette Vogele, Insurance Resource for Documentary Filmmakers, STANFORD UNIV. CTR. FOR
INTERNET AND SOCIETY BLOG (Feb. 27, 2007, 5:55 AM), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/
node/5209/. Cf. Aufderheide & Jaszi, supra, at b (discussing Stanford University’s Fair Use
Project and its commitment to defend filmmakers who comply with the Filmmakers’
Statement )
116. Aufderheide & Jaszi, supra note 115, at a, b.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.; Patricia Aufderheide, How Documentary Filmmakers Overcame their Fear of Quoting
and Learned to Employ Fair Use: A Tale of Scholarship in Action, INT’L J. COMM. 26, 33–34 (2007).
120. Aufderheide, supra note 119, at 34; Aufderheide & Jaszi, supra note 115, at a.
121. See, e.g., Filmmakers’ Statement, supra note 111, at 2; see also OpenCourseWare Code, supra
note 113.
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drafters that consensus would likely not have been reached had these big
content providers been included, the failure to even try to include them in
the discussion highlights the one-sidedness of the statements. Moreover, the
fact that it is unlikely that the two (or, more accurately, many) different sides
could agree on any common principles should raise serious flags about
relying on these statements as expressions of the appropriate boundaries of
fair use.
Even within the relevant use community there have been complaints that
only a limited number of parties were brought to the table during the
development of the statements. Both documentary filmmakers and librarians
have raised concerns to me because their expressed views were not
adequately reflected in the final statements or codes. Members of the
Association of College & Research Libraries (“ACRL”) have expressed
concerns that the Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for Academic and Research
Libraries, developed by American University and the Association of Research
Libraries, is not reflective of their needs or preferences, nor of the comments
some of them had shared with the drafters of the Code.122 I point this out
not to address the substantive merits of the specific areas of disagreement
between these groups of expert and equally well-intentioned librarians, but
instead to highlight some of the concerns of adopting any of these
statements as expressions of the scope of fair use in a particular context.
A second major concern with the statements is that in their drafters’
efforts to provide greater clarity to users, the specific guidelines sometimes
exceed or narrow the boundaries of fair use beyond what is appropriate.123
122. These opinions were conveyed to me at the 2012 annual meeting of the American
Library Association, at which I spoke to members of the Copyright Discussion Group of the
ACRL.
123. See Rothman, supra note 50, at 376–78 (discussing questionable interpretation of
fair use). For purposes of this Article, I will not focus on this aspect of the best practices
statements, though the lack of consideration of market harm in the fair use analysis is
another basis not to adopt the statements as complete expressions of the boundaries of fair
use. See id.; see also Filmmakers’ Statement, supra note 111, at 2; OpenCourseWare Code, supra note
113 (although noting that injury to copyright holders’ earnings has some relevance, listing
only “transformativeness” and “amount used” as “core” considerations in determining fair
use). Even though it is true that transformativeness has become increasingly important in
recent years in fair use assessments, it has not completely replaced market harm as a
consideration. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–
2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 584–86, 616–17 (2008) (determining that 83.8% of the time
the evaluation of market harm correlates with the outcome of dispositive opinions). The
statements also sometimes ignore caselaw that is not favorable to the communities or uses
addressed by the statements. For example, the OpenCourseWare Code does not address the
course packet cases in which courts have held that the copying of assigned materials for
course packets is not fair use. For a discussion of the course packet cases, see Rothman,
supra note 7, at 1935, 1940, 1953–54.
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Some of the statements limit uses beyond the requirements of copyright law
and in ways that would be detrimental to various creative and educational
communities if enforced. As mentioned, each of the statements contains
express “limitations” on categories of uses that would otherwise be fair.
Some of these limitations are overly restrictive.
One telling example limits incidental uses in circumstances that should be
uncontroversially fair. The Filmmakers’ Statement limits incidental uses of
music captured on film so that an editor and director cannot cut or edit a
scene or sequence to the beat of the captured music or allow the music to
spillover to another scene.124 Cutting to the rhythm of the music is an integral
part of the craft of filmmaking and allowing music from one scene to spill
over during a scene transition is an important technique. If the music is
captured incidentally, rather than purposefully, it should not matter how the
filmmaker constructs the scene in post-production as long as the incidentally
captured material is not substantially divorced from the situation in which it
was first recorded. Cutting to the beat of the music or smoothing out a scene
transition does not unmoor the incidentally copyrighted works from the
setting in which the music was first captured.
Another example from the Filmmakers’ Statement is a principle that limits
the ability to make documentary films that revolve around copyrighted
works. The Statement requires that “[t]o support a claim that a use [of
copyrighted works in a historical sequence] is fair, the documentarian should
be able to show that . . . the film project was not specifically designed around
the material in question.”125 This suggestion is out of sync with the demands
of filmmakers and even with the broad permitted categories of illustrative
and historical sequences. Documentary projects should continue to be able
to be designed around copyrighted works. For example, documentaries about
1950s television sitcoms, the Beach Boys, or the portrayal of gay characters
in film and television are legitimate projects, even though each project would
by necessity focus on copyrighted works. To throw all such films into a
disfavored category is especially concerning when so much of our culture—
that a filmmaker might want to comment on—is composed of copyrighted
works. Based on conversations with several attorneys at legal clinics that
frequently consider the best-practices statements, I suspect that the drafters
of the best-practices statements would agree with my assessment that these
uses should be fair and might even claim that such uses would fit within the
protected zones of the Statement. Nevertheless, this confusion about how to
interpret the Statement demonstrates the challenge of overlaying an
124. Filmmakers’ Statement, supra note 111, at 5.
125. Id. at 5–6.
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additional text, with its own share of ambiguities and missteps, on an already
complicated fair use structure.
The Statements and Codes also impose additional burdens on users that
are not required by copyright law and that have not been established as
indicative of fair use. The OpenCourseWare Code, for example, places
significant burdens on educators. Even though incidental uses of copyrighted
works in open courseware are viewed as a category favoring fair use,
educators must first try to remove copyrighted works from their materials
before being able to claim fair use.126 There is no explanation for why
educators should have to make such an effort. If the use is fair, it should not
be solely because the material was inseparable. The Code also limits
illustrative and explanatory uses to one example or illustration per point.127
As any experienced teacher knows, students learn through repetition—so
why can’t examples be cumulative? The Code also states that educators
should not use copyrighted works if the educator could create other material
independently or substitute non-copyrighted works. These limitations
concede far too much ground to copyright holders and are not required by
current fair use law.
The drafters of the best-practices statements also make a number of
concerning statements about fair use that run throughout all of the
statements and codes. Many of the statements suggest a preference for
licensing when material is easily available at reasonable rates.128 The
Filmmakers’ Statement requires all copyrighted works used in historical
sequences to be licensed if licenses can be obtained at reasonable rates. This
preference for licensing continues to make non-licensed uses suspect, the
very opposite of what that the best practices statements were trying to
achieve. By doing so, the best practices statements ironically further endorse
a concept of fair use limited to situations involving market failure (in which
licensing is not possible or the offered rates are unreasonable).129
My concern is not only with the ways the statements restrict fair uses, but
also with instances in which the statements permit uses that either are not
fair or at least are controversial and unsettled areas of fair use analysis. For
example, the Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for Online Video deems virtually all
uses fair because the commentary and critique category is read very
126. OpenCourseWare Code, supra note 113, at 10–11.
127. Id. at 12–13.
128. See, e.g., id. at 13–14 (suggesting that if there is an available licensing regime
educators should license demonstrative and explanatory uses, as well as supplementary and
assigned readings).
129. I have previously critiqued this model of fair use. See Rothman, supra note 76, at
528–29, 532–33.
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broadly.130 In the report supporting this code, the drafters suggest that a
mashup titled Clint Eastwood’s “The Office,” which mixed together clips
from the television series The Office with the movie Evan Almighty, would be a
fair use.131 This conclusion was based on an assessment that such a use would
fit within the favored category of commentary or critique.132 Although it may
not be immediately apparent how this mashup is a commentary, the
contention is that this user-generated content shows what it would be like if
Clint Eastwood directed an episode of The Office and therefore provides a
cultural commentary on the two films and Eastwood as well.133 This analysis
opens the door so wide that there can be no market for licensing material for
such mashups. I do not think fair use demands such a broad reading. There
is at least a colorable argument that such mashups would cause significant
market harm and interfere with new business models for content creators.
Not all mashups are infringing, but neither are they all fair.134 This is still a
developing area and one private group with its own particular interests
should not determine the scope of fair use in this context for everyone.
Thus far, courts have not given credence to (or rejected) these best
practices statements and codes. Parties nevertheless are beginning to cite
them more frequently in their briefs as a basis for asserting fair use.135
130. CTR. FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, CODE OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE FOR ONLINE
VIDEO (2008), available at http://www.cmsimpact.org/sites/default/files/online_best
_practices_in_fair_use.pdf.
131. CTR FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, RECUT, REFRAME, RECYCLE: QUOTING COPYRIGHTED
MATERIAL IN USER-GENERATED VIDEO 7–9 (2008), available at http://www.cmsimpact.
org/sites/default/files/CSM_Recut_Reframe_Recycle_report.pdf.
132. Id. at 8 (classifying this mashup as a “meta-commentary” that fits within the
preferred category of “negative or crucial commentary”).
133. Id.
134. The Department of Commerce’s Internet Task Force has remained neutral on the
issue and has called for further discussion and roundtables on the issue. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, supra note 4, at 3, 28–29, 101.
135. See, e.g., Brief of Appellees at 15–16, 54, Cambridge Univ. Press v. Albert, Nos. 1214676-FF, 12-15147-FF (11th Cir. argued Nov. 19, 2013) (citing the Copyright Clearance
Center’s (“CCC”) fair use checklist and citing the CCC’s “White Paper” dated March 2011
titled “Using Electronic Reserves: Guidelines and Best Practices for Copyright Compliance,”
arguing the district court correctly applied fair use because the electronic use of one book
chapter is a “best practice”); Reply Brief of Appellants, Cambridge Univ. Press, at 25 n.6 (citing
to the CCC’s White Paper, arguing that the district court erroneously applied fair use because
the CCC “advises the opposite of what the district court did”); Brief for American Library
Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance, Cambridge Univ. Press, at 4, 6–10,
13–14, 18, (citing and quoting the Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for Academic and
Research Libraries, asserting fair use on the basis that the university’s electronic reserves
policy “[e]mbodies [w]idespread and [w]ell-[e]stablished [b]est [p]ractices in [f]air [u]se”);
Brief for Org. for Transformative Works et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee and
Cross-Appellant Stephanie Lenz, Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., Nos. 13-16106, 13-16107,
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Although the drafters of the statements point out that they do not intend the
statements to set forth the full scope of fair use, courts may view uses that
exceed the limits of these statements as suspect. This is exactly what we have
seen happen elsewhere—as with courts’ treatment of violations of the
Classroom Guidelines and dominant industry licensing practices. The
possibility that the best-practices statements will set the ceiling rather than
the floor of fair use is particularly concerning given some of the problematic
limits set forth within the codes and statements.
C.

LIMITING THE ROLE OF PRIVATE FAIR USE GUIDELINES

Despite my concerns about the best-practices statements and the
problematic history of the Classroom Guidelines, both of these types of
guidelines are useful. They are informative and highlight potential areas of
fair use needs in given communities. Any reforms to the Copyright Act
should continue to allow room for the development of such statements. The
law, however, should clarify that courts should not be bound by these
guidelines when deciding fair use. Neither compliance nor noncompliance
with the statements and other private fair use guidelines should provide a
basis to find or reject fair use. As with the risk-averse clearance-culture
practices, the law should not lock in these aspects of private ordering.
Government agencies involved in copyright laws and policies have
increasingly referred to these private fair use guidelines, but have not fully
engaged with either their benefits or pitfalls.136 The Department of
Commerce recently stated that it “supports private efforts to explore the
parameters of fair use, and notes that best practices produced with input
from both user groups and right holders can offer the greatest certainty.”137
Even though the Department of Commerce has stated its support of such
guidelines in theory, it appropriately noted that the guidelines would be only
minimally useful in creating safe spaces for “fair” uses unless a variety of

at *28 (9th Cir. appeal docketed May 31, 2013) (arguing that Universal Music can make fair
use assessments before issuing takedown notices by relying on American University’s Best
Practices Statements); Brief for American Library Association et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellees and Affirmance at 5–6, 17–19, Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, No.
12-4547, 2014 WL 2576342 (2d Cir. 2014) (arguing that HathiTrust Digital Library’s uses
were fair because they were consistent with the Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for
Academic and Research Libraries). But see Mot. to Dismiss Second Amend. Compl., Lenz v.
Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008), at 5 (arguing against using
Electronic Frontier Foundation’s “Fair Use Principles for User Generated Video Content,”
because the principles are not found in the Copyright Act).
136. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 4, at 22–23, 29, 65 (pointing to American
University’s fair use guidelines and the fair use checklist created at Columbia).
137. Id. at 23.
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parties on different sides of the issues were represented in the guidelines’
development.138
IV.

ALTERNATIVE OVERLAYS TO COPYRIGHT: THE
CREATIVE COMMONS APPROACH

The difficulty of determining the limits and exceptions to copyright law,
which has driven both the clearance culture and the various private
guidelines discussed in Parts II and III, has encouraged several other efforts
to provide a greater ability to use copyrighted works. Instead of focusing on
the users, some efforts have focused on creators who would prefer a
copyright law that is more permissive and that makes it easier for thirdparties to use and share works. One of the most successful of these efforts is
Creative Commons. Creative Commons is a nonprofit organization that was
formed in 2001 with the idea of layering an alternative, formalized licensing
regime on top of existing copyright law.139 Creative Commons’s mission is to
provide greater freedom to use works than the defaults of copyright law. The
project has been tremendously successful. Hundreds of millions of works
have been licensed using Creative Commons licenses.140 Major bands and
recording artists, such as Nine Inch Nails and David Byrne, have used these
licenses, as have Al Jazeera, Google, the California Digital Open Source
Library, and even the White House.141 The most common Creative
Commons licenses require attribution but permit noncommercial derivative
works or adaptations if the new work is distributed in a share-alike manner—
i.e., under the same Creative Commons licensing regime under which it is
licensed.142

138. See id.; see also Rothman, supra note 7, at 1972–73.
139. See CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/ (last visited June 9, 2014).
140. Brief for Creative Commons Corporation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Plaintiff-Appellant at 1–2, Jacobson v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
141. Id. at *1; Who Uses CC?, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/whouses-cc/ (last visited June 16, 2014); S.B. 1053 Creates the California Open Source Digital Library,
CREATIVE COMMONS, http://wiki.creativecommons.org/S.B._1053_Creates_the_California
_Open_Source_Digital_Library/ (last visited July 23, 2014).
142. License Statistics, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://wiki.creativecommons.org/Metrics/
License_statistics/ (last modified Mar. 2, 2014, 3:46 PM). Attribution is now a requirement
of all Creative Commons licenses, but it started out as an option that licensors could choose.
Creative Commons defines a derivative work as a “work based upon the Work or upon the
Work and other pre-existing works, such as a translation, musical arrangement,
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction,
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which the Work may be recast, transformed,
or adapted . . . .” License, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/bync-nd/3.0/us/legalcode/ (last visited June 29, 2014).
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Creative Commons is not intended to replace copyright law, but instead
provides an easy way to tailor the scope of copyright for particular creators
who only want to exercise some, rather than all of the exclusive rights that
copyright provides.143 The Creative Commons motto is “some rights
reserved,” as opposed to copyright law’s traditional “all rights reserved.”144
Creative Commons is an important intervention in the one-size-fits-all
approach to copyright and one that does not need codification. It both
facilitates the enactment of particular authors’ preferences and the
communication of those preferences to potential users.
Copyright law should support alternative regimes like Creative
Commons. This can largely be done by staying clear of the fray.
Nevertheless, there are some ways that future copyright revisions could
support (or at least not discourage) the adoption of Creative Commons and
other alternative licenses. In particular, it would be helpful to clarify that a
violation of a Creative Commons license or other private overlay does not
put a user in a worse position than if she had used a copyrighted work that
was not put out under such a license. Although the legal code to the Creative
Commons licenses expressly states this, it is not clear that courts or litigants
will so interpret the effect of these licenses.
Under the current regime, users might avoid Creative Commons–licensed
works, particularly if they know they cannot comply with the terms of the
licenses.145 Many users cannot comply with the share-alike provision,
particularly when it limits uses to those that are noncommercial.146
143. See CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/ (last visited June 9, 2014).
There have been a number of smaller scale efforts to provide alternative visions of copyright
law. The American Library Association as early as the 1970s started distributing journals with
notices that the journals could “be photocopied for the noncommercial purpose of scientific
or educational advancement” without permission. See NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 51 (1979).
144. Creative Commons licenses also allow for the dedication of works to the public
domain. In these instances, rather than “some rights [being] reserved,” “no rights [are]
reserved.” See CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/ (last visited June 9,
2014).
145. I have had several conversations with documentary filmmakers who have been
reluctant to use works licensed under Creative Commons licenses once they realize that they
cannot conform to the offered license, even if they have a strong fair use defense.
146. The term noncommercial is not defined, but has often been interpreted as uses that
are for an economic profit. Creative Commons has determined that most Internet users
consider something commercial when users earn money for the use (whether via online
advertising or otherwise). See CREATIVE COMMONS, DEFINING “NONCOMMERCIAL”: A
STUDY OF HOW THE ONLINE POPULATION UNDERSTANDS “NONCOMMERCIAL USE” 11–12
(2009). This interpretation of “noncommercial” means that documentary films distributed
for any payment would be considered commercial.
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Filmmakers, for example, even documentary filmmakers, usually seek some
sort of commercial distribution for their projects. When deciding whether to
rely on fair use of a Creative Commons work or fair use of a traditionally
distributed one, users may avoid Creative Commons works. This is true for a
variety of reasons.
First, as a practical matter, is a person who licenses under a Creative
Commons rubric more or less likely to sue for a violation of that license?
Those who use Creative Commons licenses may well wish to sue for
copyright infringement if others use the works without following the
licensing restrictions. Copyright holders who requested that the underlying
works not be altered or distributed commercially may be particularly likely to
sue parties who do so in contravention of expressed preferences.147 On the
other hand, creators who actively seek out the more permissive Creative
Commons license for their work may be more sympathetic to users and less
likely to sue for infringement.
Second, users may worry that a violation of the license will weigh against
a finding of fair use. As discussed, this is a legitimate fear. When defendants
exceed their own in-house guidelines or the Classroom Guidelines or fail to
conform with industry licensing practices, courts are much more likely to
reject a fair use defense.148 A court may similarly disfavor uses that exceed the
expressed preference of the creator/owner as set forth in the violated
Creative Commons license. To the extent that fair use is sometimes thought
of as an equitable doctrine that considers what is fair in a normative sense,
courts and juries may be less inclined toward users who knowingly violate the
express wishes of the copyright holder.149 Even though the all-rights-reserved
default of copyright law might also limit the intended use, a court might look
more favorably on such a use because there was no express preference that
was communicated and then violated.

147. See, e.g., Complaint at 3–9, Gatehouse Media v. That’s Great News, L.L.C., No.
10CV50165, 2010 WL 2960003 (N.D. Ill. June 30, 2010) (publisher of local newspapers
disseminated electronically under a Creative Commons license sues for copyright
infringement when a for-profit business uses reprints of articles and/or plaques with
articles); Complaint at 3–4, Foster v. Virgin Enters. Ltd., No. 2:14cv04113 (C.D. Cal. May
29, 2014) (suing for copyright infringement of photograph which had been offered under a
noncommercial Creative Commons license when it was used by a commercial airline on its
website without attribution, permission or payment); Cards Against Humanity, L.L.C. v.
Loftek Technological Co., L.L.C., No. C13-0727, 2013 WL 693441, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
February 19, 2013) (suing for copyright infringement, inter alia, for sale of knock-off card
game when plaintiff’s game had been issued under a Creative Commons license).
148. See discussion supra at Sections II.B & III.B.
149. See Rothman, supra note 7, at 1937–41, 1979–80.

1628

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29:1595

To the extent that a fair use defense is rejected, the violation of the
Creative Commons license could also serve as evidence of bad faith or
willfulness which will throw the defendant into the higher statutory-damages
range and open the defendant up to criminal liability. Few courts have
considered the effect of Creative Commons licenses, though parties have
filed an increasing number of complaints involving alleged violations of such
licenses or seeking declaration of noninfringement on the basis of reliance on
those licenses.150 Notably, some have claimed that at least one entity is using
Creative Commons licenses to lure users and then, when they take the bait,
threatening to sue for copyright infringement.151
A final concern for potential users of works licensed under Creative
Commons licenses is uncertainty over whether a breach-of-contract claim
could exist for the violation of the license. The licenses suggest that only
copyright claims remain if the license terminates,152 but litigants have claimed
that a breach of the license’s provisions gives rise not only to a claim for
copyright infringement, but also to a breach-of-contract claim.153 Such a
contract claim could potentially survive a finding that a use is fair.
150. See, e.g., Promedical Inc. v. 3 Lions Pub’g Inc., No. 1:12-CV-1355, at *3–7
(M.D.N.C. December 21, 2012) (seeking declaratory judgment for noninfringement of work
when complied with Creative Commons license); Amended Complaint for Damages, Dell v.
Woodstream Corp., No. 09-CV-1010, 2009 WL 1952693 (N.D. Ga. April 21, 2009)
(copyright infringement claim based on use of work licensed under a Creative Commons
license); Original Complaint, St. Luke’s Episcopal Health Sys. v. 3 Lions Pub’g, Inc., No.
4:12-cv-3134, 2012 WL 5362417 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 22, 2012) (seeking declaratory judgment for
noninfringement of work when complied with Creative Commons license); Complaint,
O’Neill v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. CV11-8193, 2011 WL 4802875 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3,
2011) (seeking punitive damages for use of photograph in violation of Creative Commons
license); see also infra note 153.
151. See, e.g., Promedical, No. 1:12-CV-1355, at *3–7 (claiming that 3 Lions was a
“copyright troll” that used Creative Commons licenses as bait); see also St. Luke’s, 2012 WL
5362417.
152. The license is supposed to terminate upon breach. See, e.g., Creative Commons
Attribution 3.0 United States License Legal Code, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
3.0/us/legalcode/ (last visited July 25, 2014).
153. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint, GateHouse Media, Inc. v. That’s Great News,
L.L.C., No. 10CV50165, 2010 WL 2960003 (N.D. Ill. June 30, 2010) (suing for both
copyright infringement and breach of contract for the violation of a Creative Commons
license and the commercial use of copyrighted news stories); Gatehouse Media Mass. I, Inc.
v. N.Y. Times Co., No. 1:08-12114-WGY, 2009 WL 301807 (D. Mass, Jan. 22, 2009) (same);
cf. Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that limits on use of
copyrighted work provided in alternative license were conditions the violation of which
could give rise to an action for copyright infringement). Creative Commons filed an amicus
brief in Jacobson advocating for the position that the Federal Circuit ultimately took.
Violations of Creative Commons licenses give rise to copyright-infringement actions. Brief
for Creative Commons Corporation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant at
6, 11, Jacobson, 535 F.3d 1373. The brief did not address the question of whether there could
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Another concern with Creative Commons licenses that I have previously
observed is that courts may import Creative Commons norms into evaluating
the scope of copyright more broadly.154 It would not be surprising,
particularly as Creative Commons licenses become more popular, for courts
to suggest that because a Creative Commons license is available and an
author did not adopt one, that the copyright holder wants a stronger form of
copyright. Again, this is not the intention of Creative Commons, but it
nevertheless may influence courts’ analysis. Courts should not consider the
fact that a person has chosen not to employ a Creative Commons license as
somehow revealing a narrower scope of fair use or a broader view of
copyright.155
Government agencies have begun to recognize the popularity of Creative
Commons licenses and the possibility that alternative licensing regimes will
layer on top of existing copyright law.156 The government, however, has not
provided an in-depth analysis of how formal law should address these
agreements. The Copyright Act could explicitly state that violations of such
licenses—say by sharing, but not sharing alike—should not weigh in favor of
finding copyright infringement, rejecting a fair use defense, or making a
finding of willful infringement. An added provision that excludes
consideration of licensing and private guidelines could also exclude
consideration of alternative licensing mechanisms available to authors in the
context of fair use evaluations.157 The statute could also clarify when a breach
of contract involving a copyrighted work gives rise to a copyright
infringement claim and a contract claim, or only one or the other. As I will
discuss in the following Part, such language could also address the broader
issue of violations of consumer contracts. The Creative Commons legal team
could address some of these concerns privately by agreeing to defend or at
least file supporting amicus briefs on behalf of defendants who risk
additional penalties or the rejection of a fair use defense on the basis of a
violation of a Creative Commons license. Nevertheless, having copyright law
directly tackle the issue may provide greater support for these alternative
be a separate breach-of-contract claim nor the effect on licensors who may unreasonably
seek to recover for copyright-infringement damages even when a party has complied with a
Creative Commons license. These issues are likely to be litigated over the next few years, but
Congress may wish to anticipate some of these likely conflicts.
154. Rothman, supra note 7, at 1979–80.
155. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint at n.11, Korpi v. Apple, Inc., No. 11CV00906,
2012 WL 3137659 (W.D. Tex. May 16, 2012) (noting that plaintiff did not choose to
distribute her work under the more liberal Creative Commons license).
156. Pallante, supra note 1, at 333–34; DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 4, at 29
(suggesting Creative Commons licenses could be a useful way to authorize remixes).
157. See discussion supra at Section II.C & infra Section VI.A.
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regimes. In addition, as I will discuss in Part VI, the Copyright Office could
provide more choices for authors to opt in or out of particular aspects of
copyright law through the registration process, potentially including a
Creative Commons license option.158
V.

USING TECHNOLOGY AND CONTRACTS TO ALTER
COPYRIGHT’S TRADITIONAL BOUNDARIES

The last category of private ordering I will address is the effort by
content creators to enforce their copyrights in the online and digital
environment, as well as to restrict uses of those works, including
uncopyrightable aspects. There are two dominant mechanisms for doing so:
using technology to restrict uses and expand enforcement, and using contract
law to limit permissible uses. The shift to digital formats has facilitated the
use of technology to monitor and control uses of works. It also has allowed
works to be distributed subject to clickwrap (or browsewrap) licenses that
limit uses of those works.159 This digital shift has often moved consumers
from owners of physical copies to mere licensees of digital files.
In contrast to the other types of private ordering discussed thus far, these
practices are driven primarily by content providers that seek to expand the
control they have over their copyrighted works. Much has already been
written about this aspect of private ordering and an in-depth engagement
with these myriad complex issues is beyond the scope of this project.160
Nevertheless, it is a vital area to identify and address as part of any project to
revise copyright law. I will briefly discuss the role of technology and
contracts, and suggest that the Copyright Act needs to intervene to prevent
copyright law and its underlying public-minded policy goals from becoming
obsolete.
158. See discussion infra Subsection VI.B.2.
159. Clickwrap licenses require online users to click to indicate their agreement to
various license terms. A browsewrap license is provided on a website, but consumers may or
may not read it and do not ever explicitly agree to its terms; instead, the website operator
claims to bind the user merely by virtue of the user visiting the website.
160. See, e.g., Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885 (2008);
Lydia Pallas Loren, Slaying the Leather-Winged Demons in the Night: Reforming Copyright Owner
Contracting with Clickwrap Misuse, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 495 (2004); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond
Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111 (1999); J.H.
Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling
Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875 (1999); David
Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 CAL. L. REV. 17 (1999); Julie E.
Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93 (1998), Niva
Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93
(1997).
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TECHNOLOGICAL PROTECTION MEASURES AND DIGITAL RIGHTS
MANAGEMENT

Content creators and owners have increasingly turned to technology to
limit uses of their works and to prevent unlawful mass copying of their
content online. Technology has been used in a variety of ways to restrict
what can be done with copyrighted works and to identify, track, and remove
uses of copyrighted works online. Often such technology is put under the
broad term of technological protection measures (“TPM”), which applies to
many different types of technology that control both access to and uses of
copyrighted works. Sometimes the term digital rights management (“DRM”)
is also used to describe technology that manages access to works, and tracks
and limits uses of those works.161 Manufacturers embed works with various
digital marks when they are initially distributed. For example, CDs, DVDs
and other digital audio and video files are often digitally watermarked. The
watermarking allows content owners and others to trace back copies to their
original source. Television studios also embed shows with digital bits (known
as broadcast flags) that can be used to scan for these files if they are copied
or uploaded online.
TPM and DRM make a lot of sense in the online world and pave the way
for a workable and highly profitable online environment for professional
content providers. They also allow content creators to price-discriminate
based on the types of uses consumers would like to make of copyrighted
works. These are all valuable features that are worth permitting. However, if
left unchecked, these technologies threaten to profoundly alter the way we
engage with copyrighted works and not always for the better.
Restrictive TPM and DRM raise a variety of concerns. First, content
owners can use technology to effectively eliminate the first sale doctrine in
the online context, by preventing the sharing or future sale of books and
music—historically permissible and protected activities. When a person
purchases a physical copy of a book, she can pass it on to a friend, mate, or
her heirs after her death. The book can provide continued intellectual
sustenance to second-comers and a shared experience across generations.
Now, an individual cannot easily give a book downloaded to a Kindle or
other digital device to a friend (unless the friends use devices that are
registered to the same account) and it is not entirely clear whether a Kindle
161. TPM is also sometimes referred to as “technical protection measures.” The terms
TPM and DRM are often used interchangeably, although DRM can be used more broadly
for digital rights management that includes notices of rights or contract terms (sometimes
this is also called RMI or “rights management information”). For purposes of this
discussion, I am focusing primarily on the terms’ overlapping areas of meaning.
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library can be passed on to heirs.162 In fact, users do not even own the books
downloaded to a Kindle but simply license them.163 Libraries are particularly
concerned that this shift from an ownership world to one of licensees may
prevent libraries from loaning books in the future—at least in digital
formats.164 This sea change in the way we interact with books may be
acceptable and market pressures may provide consumers with a variety of
choices in the long run, but we should carefully consider the broader
implications and whether this is the system that we want.
Second, TPM can limit the ability to make fair uses of works. For
example, TPM prevents (or at least significantly restricts) professors from
copying excerpts of DVDs for use in class, documentarians from using clips
for illustrative or other purposes in a film, and average citizens and artists
from making a collage of digital magazine photos for fun, for a class project,
or in an artwork. Each of these uses is likely fair, but various technologies
prevent or at least obstruct such uses. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(“DMCA”) worsens this problem by criminalizing the circumvention of
TPM, even if the underlying uses of the works would otherwise be
permissible—such as copying facts or making a fair use of a work. Although
the Copyright Office has approved some exceptions to the
anticircumvention provisions through the regulatory process (including
exceptions for documentary filmmakers and educators), these exceptions are
limited in scope and temporary.165
Not only does TPM limit how one can use copyrighted works, but these
technologies also fundamentally alter the landscape of enforcement of
copyright law. Uses that were never traceable in the analog world are easily
identifiable and stoppable in the digital world. Content-identification
software allows content owners and Internet service providers to easily
identify and remove copyrighted works from the Internet even if the uses of
those works are fair. Programs can identify copyrighted songs, images, and
videos. Viacom and Google (on behalf of YouTube) recently made a deal to
162. Susan from 29, e-Books: Who Owns My Digital Library?, DAILY KOS (May 8, 2013,
11:00 a.m.), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/05/08/1205979/-e-books-who-ownsmy-digital-library/. I note that some sharing of books that are in the public domain may be
permitted.
163. See generally Michael Seringhaus, E-Book Transactions: Amazon “Kindles” the Copy
Ownership Debate, 12 YALE L.J. & TECH. 147 (2009) (arguing that ebook transactions should
be treated as sales to promote public welfare).
164. Digital Rights Management (DRM) & Libraries, AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION,
http://www.ala.org/advocacy/copyright/digitalrights (last visited June 17, 2014).
165. See, e.g., Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection
Systems for Access Control Technologies, 77 Fed. Reg. 65260 (Oct. 26, 2012) (to be codified
at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201).
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remove copyrighted Viacom material from YouTube—without considering
whether various uses might be fair, rather than infringing.166 This technology
is driven by legitimate efforts to stop online piracy (which I define as the
wholesale taking and distribution of entire copyrighted works with the intent
of supplanting the market for the original). However, the software sweeps
much more broadly. For example, the software may remove video clips that
have copyrighted music playing in the background while a child shows off his
dance moves or that contain brief excerpts of Fox News broadcasts that
have been gathered together to point out various factual errors.167 Not all
content-identification software removes material. One alternative business
model, often adopted by record labels, is to advertise alongside the use of the
copyrighted work—either to generate ad revenue or to sell downloads of the
song that is used in a video—rather than to remove the unlicensed uses.
The software that identifies and removes copyrighted content could be
programmed to allow some breathing room for fair uses, but often it is not.
For example, NBC developed very successful software to stop piracy of its
coverage of the 2012 London Olympic games. NBC designed the software to
remove all material no matter how short in length. If a person posted to her
blog a short clip of an amazing vault from the women’s gymnastics
competition that she found inspirational, NBC would have it taken it down.
If a father posted the last lap of his son’s winning freestyle gold medal swim,
the software would take it down. NBC could have designed the program to
allow such short clips, but it did not.168 Major content providers simply are
not concerned with preserving a space for fair use by consumers, even if they
are interested in being able to rely on fair use themselves.
Not every one of the examples I have given in this discussion is
uncontroversially fair, but many similar uses have historically been permitted

166. See Meg James, Viacom and Google Settle Massive Copyright Lawsuit, L.A. TIMES (Mar.
18, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-viacom-andgoogle-settle-copyright-lawsuit-20140318-story.html (describing as part of the settlement
agreement a private deal to monitor and remove Viacom’s copyrighted works, a deal that has
been made with approximately 5000 other copyright holders).
167. Cf. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008), appeal
docketed, No. 13-16107 (9th Cir. May 31, 2013) (seeking a declaratory judgment of
noninfringement of Prince’s song after UMG sent a take-down notice for her video of her
son dancing to Let’s Go Crazy). To see the original video and consider whether it was a
substitutionary use of Prince’s song, take a look at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
N1KfJHFWlhQ. Also consider the video at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
gYsGCNMdvzU (lampooning various Fox News errors in their graphics).
168. This information is based on a series of conversations with Glenn Reitmeier,
Senior Vice President for Advanced Technology, NBC Universal, during The Evolving Internet
symposium at the University of Pennsylvania on October 19–20, 2012.
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(offline), even if only because of enforcement hurdles.169 Current and
developing technology combined with the shift to digital formats will make
many uses of copyrighted works that we used to take for granted very
difficult, if not impossible. As part of the review process we need to do some
serious soul searching about whether we want personal uses of copyrighted
works to be a thing of the past or be limited only to the analog world. If we
take seriously the needs of “readers, viewers, listeners, watchers, builders and
inhabitants,” as Jessica Litman has powerfully advocated, then the law needs
to protect a space for both personal and other fair uses in the digital arena.170
Although I do not think that all personal uses should be exempted from
copyright enforcement, there must be some breathing room built into
copyright law that protects self-expression, freedom of speech, historical
documentation, cultural and intimate communication, and religious
worship.171 Concerns over piracy are legitimate, but must be balanced with
concerns over the harms that follow from what Lawrence Lessig has dubbed
a “lock[ed] down culture.”172
The current Register of Copyrights, Maria Pallante, has recognized that
some of these “voluntary [DRM] initiatives” may be helpful in the
enforcement of copyright.173 The Department of Commerce has
“encourage[d] stakeholders to continue to work together to develop
identification and filtering systems . . . .” However, the Department of
Commerce importantly added that these efforts should be “consistent with
rights to due process and free expression.”174 Unfortunately, thus far, the
content industries are not proactively providing space for fair use online.
Given the market failure in this arena and the importance of allowing
individuals to engage with copyrighted works in a variety of ways in the
digital space, statutory intervention may be necessary to assure that content
providers respect the needs of their viewers, listeners, readers, and other
creators. Revisions to the Copyright Act must engage with this tension,

169. See Rothman, supra note 76, at 472–73.
170. See Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871, 1880 & passim (2007).
Although I agree with Professor Litman’s overarching point, I have argued that the privatepublic dimensions and commercial-noncommercial dimensions of the analysis should not
determine whether uses are personal. See Rothman, supra note 76, at 472–74.
171. See generally Rothman, supra note 76 (promoting a liberty-based lens for copyright
law and suggesting preferred categories of uses of copyrighted works).
172. Lessig, supra note 10.
173. Pallante, supra note 1, at 326.
174. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 4, at 67.
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rather than avoid the issue and simply let the market take care of itself.175
Given the underlying goals of promoting progress and incentivizing new
works, as well as the important constitutionally protected values of free
speech, liberty, and privacy, copyright law should build in protections for fair
use. Content owners and providers should not be able to terminate fair use in
the digital sphere.
B.

CONTRACTING AROUND COPYRIGHT

Consumer contracts have augmented and expanded the lock-down world
created by these technological measures. Nonnegotiable contracts of
adhesion have become the standard way to disseminate copyrighted works
on digital platforms. Most consumers never read these contracts (even when
they click a box agreeing to the terms) and do not realize that the contracts
fundamentally alter what they can do with copyrighted works. Many
contracts prohibit sharing the work with other family members, reselling the
work, using the underlying data, reverse-engineering, or making any other fair
use of the work.176 All of these uses are otherwise expressly permitted by the
Copyright Act.177 Even outside the mass-market context, parties have tried to
secure rights through contracts that are broader than copyright provides.178
Some of these contracts potentially create negative externalities for society
and stand in opposition to the public-minded goals of copyright law.
Courts have come to a variety of conclusions about the legitimacy and
implications of these types of contracts. In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, the
Seventh Circuit upheld a shrinkwrap license provision that restricted the
copying of uncopyrightable facts.179 Other courts and commentators have
disagreed with the holding of ProCD in similar contexts.180 The question of
175. See generally Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of
“Rights Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998) (criticizing the Lochner-like approach to
digital rights management and advocating for greater protection of broader “social welfare”).
176. See generally Viva R. Moffat, Super Copyright: Contracts, Preemption, and the Structure of
Copyright Policymaking, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 45 (2007) (recommending preemption as a
solution to these pernicious adhesion contracts); Michael E. Kenneally, Commandeering
Copyright, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1179 (2012) (examining and largely criticizing the
widespread use of contracts to “reassign, on a massive scale, the entitlements initially
assigned by copyright”).
177. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 107, 109 (2012).
178. Cf. C.B.C. Dist. & Mktg. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077
(E.D. Mo. 2006) (Major League Baseball sought unsuccessfully to enforce a contract
provision that precluded the future right of C.B.C. to use players’ names and team names in
a fantasy sports league), aff’d, 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007).
179. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). A shrinkwrap license is
one that is agreed to by opening the packaging of a product, often computer software.
180. See, e.g., Veeck v. Southern Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir.
2002) (holding that a defendant could copy and distribute building codes despite license that
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the validity of these contracts and, more broadly, contract provisions that
exceed the limits of copyright law is still unresolved.
The issue of what remedies are appropriate for breached copyright
licenses is also unclear. In MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc.,
the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant who had violated a contract provision
could be held liable for breach of contract, but not copyright infringement,
because the violation was of a covenant, not a condition.181 The Ninth Circuit
distinguished between conditions of licenses and covenants, holding that
only a violation of the former could be held to infringe a copyright. The
court, concerned about unreasonable expansions of copyright law to the
detriment of the public, limited copyright infringement to violations of the
contract that implicated one of the exclusive rights provided by copyright.182
If an exclusive right provided for by copyright law was not violated, only a
breach of contract claim would remain. How this rule will be applied in
future cases and whether other courts should or will agree with the Ninth
Circuit’s analysis has not yet been resolved, and it may well be an issue that is
better resolved legislatively than judicially.
Another issue raised by contracts in the digital sphere is whether there is
a digital first sale doctrine. The first sale doctrine offline permits purchasers
of copyrighted works to sell or give those works to others.183 The question of
whether this doctrine should translate to the digital world is contested. In the
digital context, consumers often think they are purchasing works when they
are instead only granted a license to use them. These licenses restrict the
ability to transfer works. Courts have struggled with the question of whether
licenses (particularly those distributed online) can limit the first sale doctrine.
In Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., the Ninth Circuit rejected the idea of a digital first
sale doctrine (at least where a license was involved) and held that the
defendant was a licensee rather than the owner of computer software that he
had purchased.184 In that decision, the Ninth Circuit left it to Congress to
limited such uses); Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp, 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (holding clickwrap license unenforceable); Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d
1332 (D. Kan. 2000) (holding that shrinkwrap license did not form an enforceable contract);
1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.04[B][3][a] (2014);
Mark Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239 (1995).
181. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc.629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010).
182. Id. at 940–41.
183. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908) (holding that a copyright owner
could not control the distribution right after a sale despite a notice in the front of the book
that it could not be resold for less than one dollar). The Supreme Court in Bobbs-Merrill did
not decide whether a license could be used instead of a sale to limit uses and preclude a
transfer of ownership. At least some appellate courts think that such licenses would be
permissible. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010).
184. Id.
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address some of the broader policy questions at issue—both whether the
first sale doctrine should be preserved in the digital environment and also
whether licensing could be used to circumvent it.185 This treatment contrasts
with recent decisions in the offline context. For example, the Ninth Circuit
rejected a claim by the record labels that promotional CDs were only
provided under a licensing regime and held that the recipients could transfer
the CDs without infringing copyrights.186 Both the Department of
Commerce and Register of Copyrights have recognized that the limitations
on the first sale doctrine in the digital context require further study and
review.187 Maria Pallante has suggested that “Congress may not want a
copyright law where everything is licensed and nothing is owned.”188 The
primary mechanism to prevent such a future is through copyright legislation.
In sum, the vast control asserted by content providers through contracts
and technology is growing and threatens the limiting principles of copyright
law. Revisions to the copyright act must address these aspects of private
ordering to prevent much of copyright’s public-minded framework from
fading into the background.
VI.

LEARNING FROM PRIVATE ORDERING

Private ordering can serve as a laboratory for the development of
different approaches to addressing the challenges presented by copyright.
Many use communities have developed a variety of norms and practices that
suggest some common preferences for how people would like their creative
works to be used. These norms have developed in the shadow of the law, but
are not always driven by efforts to conform to the law or to limit legal
exposure. Some of these privately generated understandings are
uncontroversial and merit codification. At other times, private efforts
jeopardize the delicate balance of our copyright ecosystem and their reach
must be limited.
In this final Part, I make some preliminary recommendations for
addressing the issues raised by private ordering in the context of revisions to
the formal law. I do not intend this section to provide a comprehensive list
of preferred revisions to copyright law. Instead, I focus only on suggestions
185. Id. at 1115.
186. See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011)
(upholding ownership transfer and applicability of first sale doctrine in the context of
promotional CDs sent out by record labels that bore the message that only a license was
being provided to the recipient).
187. See Pallante, supra note 1, at 331–32; Dep’t. of Commerce, supra note 4, at 35–38,
101–02.
188. Pallante, supra note 1, at 331–32.
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that address private ordering. I focus on three main categories of changes:
first, those that seek to rein in the downsides of current private efforts;
second, those that codify good ideas that have emerged from the private
sector; and finally, those that address some of the unsettled or problematic
areas of the current legal regime that have generated some of the private
approaches.
A.

LIMITING THE EXCESSES OF PRIVATE ORDERING

Throughout this Article, I have identified specific areas of overreaching
by private parties and various downsides of private ordering. I will provide
some suggestions of how to limit these excesses.
1. Limiting the Role of Customary Licensing, Fair Use Guidelines, and
Alternative Licensing Schemes in Fair Use Evaluations
The Copyright Act should continue to provide room for parties to
license (regardless of whether such licensing is required), develop fair use
guidelines (such as those put out by American University), and provide
alternative licensing schemes (such as Creative Commons). However, the Act
should carefully circumscribe the role of these private efforts to prevent
them from altering copyright’s boundaries without robust public debate. The
clearance culture in the publishing and film worlds should not influence
courts’ independent analyses of whether particular uses are fair. Nor should a
small cross-section of documentary filmmakers decide when fair use applies
in that context. Creative Commons licenses can encourage the use of
copyrighted works in ways that creators support, but the fact that a use
breaches such a license should not weigh against a finding of fair use.
One possible solution to these concerns is to add language to the fair use
provision in § 107 that limits the consideration of such information when
evaluating fair use. For example: “Private guidelines, contracts, and
customary licensing practices should not be considered when analyzing
whether a particular use is fair.” Additional language could clarify that courts
may nevertheless consider the existence of a feasible and reasonably-priced
licensing market as one among several considerations when evaluating
market harm.189
2. Adding Clarity about Contracts
The question of whether clickwrap, browsewrap, or shrinkwrap licenses
are enforceable remains open, as does the broader question of whether
189. See discussion supra Section II.C.
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contracts can protect uncopyrightable aspects of works. Congress should
revise the Copyright Act to address these and other vexing questions about
contracts involving copyrighted works. Congress needs to provide parties
and courts with greater guidance.
There are a variety of ways to address these issues. One approach is to
clarify the applicability of copyright preemption to overreaching contracts by
revising § 301, the preemption provision of the current Act.190 Preemption,
however, may be too blunt an instrument and may not be able to
accommodate price discrimination on the basis of different types of uses.191
The statute could also limit contract terms to prevent restrictions on the
public domain. In the mid-1990s, Representative Rick Boucher suggested
something along these lines and proposed that the following language be
added to the Copyright Act: “When a work is distributed to the public
subject to non-negotiable license terms,” the terms should not be enforced if
they “limit the reproduction, adaptation, distribution, performance or
display” of uncopyrightable material (such as facts or ideas) or restrict fair
use, the first sale doctrine, or other permissible uses provided for in sections
107 through 114 and 117 and 118 of the Copyright Act.192 Although the
suggestion died in committee when initially proposed,193 it is worth revisiting
some of his suggestions.
The Copyright Act could also clarify if (and when) violations of licensing
arrangements involving copyrighted works can give rise to copyrightinfringement claims versus breach-of-contract claims. This would not only
facilitate the protection of fair use zones, but also support uses of Creative
Commons licenses by adding clarity and predictability for both creators who
use the licenses and the licensees.
3. Protecting a Fair Use Zone
Absent statutory intervention, private efforts to expand copyright powers
threaten to make formal copyright law and fair use largely irrelevant, at least
in the digital space.194 Thus far, the market has been largely unwilling to
190. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012). I note that § 301’s language is confusing and obscure, and
more generally needs revising regardless of the issue of contracts. See Jennifer E. Rothman,
Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 199, 225–36 (2002)
(reviewing the language and legislative history of § 301 and determining that it is hopelessly
unworkable in its current form).
191. Kenneally, supra note 176, at 1200.
192. Digital Era Copyright Enhancement Act, H.R. 3048, 105th Cong. § 7 (1997).
193. See Kenneally, supra note 176, at 1199–1200.
194. Cf. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813 (2001) (suggesting that the DMCA
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protect fair uses in the digital environment. Revisions to the Copyright Act
should disrupt this trajectory.
Fair use is not an evil to be tolerated, but something that sits at the heart
of copyright’s underlying objectives. Congress should add an explicit fair use
zone to the statute: the Act should specifically require that TPM and DRM
provide breathing room for fair use; content identification systems must
provide latitude for fair use. Contracts should also be prohibited from
restricting fair uses of copyrighted works or the use of uncopyrightable
aspects of those works.
Congress should also facilitate fair uses by codifying and expanding the
exemptions to the DMCA anti-circumvention provision. At the very least,
the statute should codify exemptions that have repeatedly been renewed
(such as the exemptions for educators and documentary filmmakers). Ideally,
the exemptions would be broader than they currently are and allow
circumvention for fair uses in derivative works, regardless of whether those
works are commercial.
B.

NORMS WORTH CODIFYING

There are a variety of areas in which private ordering suggests
appropriate approaches that deserve codification. I will focus on three of
these norms—faculty ownership of scholarship and course materials,
alternative licensing mechanisms, and attribution.
1. Faculty Ownership of Scholarship and Course Materials
Most, though not all, universities have adopted explicit policies vesting
ownership of copyrighted works in the faculty. Universities that have not
explicitly adopted such policies still usually conform to a long-standing
custom of allowing faculty to retain copyright ownership over their
scholarship and course materials.195 University policy statements often justify
the academic copyright regime by referring to “established academic

“has killed” copyright as we know it by discarding copyright’s focus on the promotion of the
public interest).
195. See, e.g., HARVARD UNIV., OFFICE OF TECH. DEV., STATEMENT OF POLICY IN
REGARD TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2013), available at http://otd.harvard.edu/
resources/policies/IP/ [hereinafter Harvard IP Policy]; UNIV. OF CAL., OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA POLICY ON COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP (1992),
available at http://policy.ucop.edu/doc/2100003/CopyrightOwnership/ [hereinafter U.C.
Ownership Policy]; Virginia Policy, supra note 101; WASH. UNIV. IN ST. LOUIS, COMPLIANCE
&
POLICIES,
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
POLICY
(2013),
available
at
http://wustl.edu/policies/intelprop.html.
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traditions.”196 In part because of the reliance on customary practices regarding
copyright ownership, some universities treat computer software copyrights
differently than other scholarly works.197
These policies and practices, however, do not generally meet the
requirements of § 201 of the Copyright Act, which requires that any
exception from the work-for-hire rules be set forth in a writing signed by
both parties.198 If copyrighted works by faculty are viewed as prepared in the
scope of employment (not an uncommon conclusion), then “unless the
parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by
them,” the university should own most works produced by faculty under
current copyright law.199 There is little dispute that university faculty members
who produce scholarly books and articles are fulfilling expected job tasks.
One could, however, argue that the works are not prepared “at the direction”
of the employer since professors determine the subjects on which they write
as well as the content of the works.
Even though these university policies do not meet the statutory
requirements set forth in § 201, several courts have pointed to the customary
“faculty exception,” which places authorship in the hands of the university
faculty, as a basis to give disputed copyrights to faculty rather than

196. 1983 NYU Policy, supra note 104 (emphasis added); see also YALE UNIV., OFFICE OF
COOPERATIVE RESEARCH, YALE UNIVERSITY COPYRIGHT POLICY (2014), available at
http://ocr.yale.edu/faculty/policies/yale-university-copyright-policy/ (“[T]he University will
generally disclaim ownership of traditional copyrightable materials created by a faculty
member . . . .”) (emphasis added); U.C. Ownership Policy, supra note 195 (stating that the policy
“is intended to embody the spirit of academic tradition, which provides copyright ownership
to faculty for their scholarly and aesthetic copyrighted works”) (emphasis added); see also
UNIV. OF CHICAGO, IT SERVICES, IT POLICIES, NEW INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE UNIVERSITY (1999), available at https://itservices.
uchicago.edu/policies/new-information-technologies-and-intellectual-property-university/
(“By long-established practice, individual faculty members enjoy the royalties on any book
that they write . . . .”) (emphasis added).
197. See, e.g., Harvard IP Policy, supra note 195; 1983 NYU Policy, supra note 104 (deferring
to practices within the discipline and to individual departments to determine ownership of
computer software).
198. The work-for-hire doctrine vests ownership of works of authorship in an employer
rather than an employee when the work is produced in the scope of employment and at the
direction of the employer. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201 (2012); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737–51 (1989).
199. See 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
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universities.200 To address the potential conflict between these widely
accepted norms and § 201, Congress should add a specific provision to
clarify that works produced by university and college faculty are not works
for hire. It would also be appropriate to extend such a provision to educators
more generally (such as elementary and secondary school teachers) and to
original classroom materials and lectures, as well as scholarship. There is
widespread agreement in this area and the law should settle the matter to
avoid further uncertainty and litigation.
2. À La Carte Copyright
The Copyright Office could also learn from the success of Creative
Commons.201 The Office could allow copyright registrants to opt for Creative
Commons licenses at the time of registration and could add this information
to a searchable online database. The Office could go even further and allow
parties to tailor copyright to their needs; for example, the Office could add
checkboxes to registration forms allowing creators to opt out of or into
certain preferences. Possible choices could be allowing all educational uses
with attribution (without permission or payment), or donating the work to
the public domain after twenty-five years. The current Register of Copyrights
has expressed, at least in principle, a willingness to consider some alternative
licensing arrangements.202 The Creative Commons approach provides one
possible approach for how the Office could do this. The alternative licensing
approach would work best if potential users could easily search licenses and
registrations online.203

200. See, e.g., Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 1988) (describing
the “universal assumption and practice” that academic writing belongs to the teacher not to
the university, and concluding that if forced to decide whether the 1976 Act abolished the
teacher exception, the court would hold “that the exception had survived”); Weinstein v.
Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1094–95 (7th Cir. 1987) (describing the tradition of faculty
ownership of copyrights in works); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the
Copyright Act of 1976, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 590, 597–98 (1987); cf. Shaul v. Cherry ValleySpringfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 177, 185–86 (2d Cir. 2004) (suggesting that the faculty
exception after the 1976 revisions may be limited to circumstances in which the university
has written a policy so indicating). But see Pittsburg State Univ. Kan. Nat’l Ed. Ass’n v. Kan.
Bd. of Regents, 122 P.3d 336, 345–46 (2005) (concluding that the teacher exception did not
survive the 1976 revision); Forasté v. Brown Univ., 290 F. Supp. 2d 234, 239 n.5 (D.R.I.
2003) (same).
201. See discussion supra Part IV.
202. Pallante, supra note 1, at 333–35.
203. The government has begun to recognize that it needs to improve the searchability
of its copyright records. See DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 4, at 90; Pallante, supra note 1,
at 343; Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1203 (2010).
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3. Attribution Norms
With the exception of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, which
confers a right of attribution on creators of visual art, U.S. copyright law
does not require attribution.204 Nevertheless, many norms in the copyright
world favor providing authors with attribution. Attribution is by far the
most-often-sought provision of the Creative Commons licenses. This
preference was so ubiquitous that it is now included in all Creative Commons
licenses.205 Other use communities, such as fan fiction communities, chefs,
and authors, when asked and in practice all seek and often follow norms of
attribution.206 Many of American University’s best practices statements and
codes require that attribution be provided when uses are made and
attribution is feasible.207
The preference for attribution is not contested. Providing some
recognition of this preference may be an appropriate place for legislation.
Although a failure to provide attribution should never be dispositive of
infringement and attribution may be infeasible in a variety of circumstances,
it certainly is worth putting a thumb on the scale in the statute in favor of
attribution. One possible way of doing this (perhaps the best way) is to
explicitly add attribution as a consideration in the fair use analysis.
C.

CLARIFYING FAIR USE AND ADDING SAFE HARBORS

The main driving force behind many of the practices that I have
discussed is the uncertainty and anxiety about relying on the fair use defense.
These concerns are the impetus behind the clearance culture and litigationavoidance customs that I discussed in Part II, as well as the Classroom
Guidelines and Best Practices Statements that I discussed in Part III. Some
have argued that these private approaches are sufficient remedies for the
unpredictability and expense of fair use litigation. I disagree. Our system does
204. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012). Not only is visual art narrowly defined, but the right
can also be waived. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A(e)(1) (2012).
205. Brief for Creative Commons as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1,
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480),
2005 WL 520502 at *1.
206. See, e.g., JESSICA SILBEY, WHAT REAL PEOPLE THINK ABOUT IP: CREATIVE
COMMUNITIES, INNOVATIVE INDUSTRIES AND THE IR(RELEVANCE) OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (forthcoming 2014) (draft on file with author) (describing
in Chapters 3 & 5 author’s preference for attribution); Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric Von
Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual Property Systems: The Case of French Chefs; 19 ORG. SCI. 187,
193–94 (2008); Rebecca Tushnet, Payment in Credit: Copyright Law and Subcultural Creativity, 70
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 155–56 (2007).
207. See, e.g., OPENCOURSEWARE CODE, supra note 112, at 11–14; FILMMAKER’S
STATEMENT, supra note 110, at 4–5.
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not work if people are afraid to invoke fair use or if a plethora of alternative
guidelines suggest different and contradictory boundaries of fair use. Fair use
is not only a remedy for market failure, but also an important part of the
copyright balance. Fair use serves to further the express constitutional
directive of the copyright system to “promote the Progress of Science,”208
and it deserves additional support and clarity. I suggest four ways that the
Act could better support the assertion of fair use:
1. Revising Fair Use Factors and § 107
Even though I do not think that major revisions to the fair use factors
are required or wise, some minor revisions to § 107 could be helpful. As I
suggested earlier in subsection VI.A.1, a provision in the statute should state
that the mere fact that licensing is customary or that the use exceeds a private
guideline’s directives should not weigh against fair use, nor should
conformity with those practices or guidelines automatically establish fair use.
Several other changes might lend greater clarity to the fair use provision
and thereby disincentivize various practices that have burgeoned in the face
of uncertainty. It would be useful, for example, to add transformativeness as
an express consideration to the first fair use factor—the purpose and
character of the use. Transformativeness is a consideration in fair use analysis
that developed after the passage of the statutory fair use provision as part of
the 1976 Copyright Act. Transformativeness focuses on whether the user has
fundamentally changed, in other words “transformed,” the copyrighted work.
To provide greater guidance, the statute should clarify whether a different
purpose counts as a transformative use or if only a fundamental alteration to
the underlying work can be transformative.209 For example, in Bill Graham
Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., the Second Circuit held that the use of an
unaltered Grateful Dead poster in a biography of the band was
transformative because the poster was used for a very different purpose than
that for which it was created.210 Other courts, however, have concluded that
unaltered photographs are not transformative even if they are used for a
different purpose than the originals.211 I think a transformative purpose
208. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
209. See Rothman, supra note 76, at 490–93 (discussing the confusion as to what is
meant by transformativeness and how some interpretations leave many personal uses
without fair use protection).
210. Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608–11 (2d Cir.
2006).
211. See, e.g., Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1176 (9th Cir. 2012)
(noting in rejecting a fair use defense for the publishing of minimally altered wedding
photographs that using works for a different “purpose is not quite the same thing as
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should often weigh in favor of fair use and would prefer codification of the
more generous interpretation of transformativeness;212 however, regardless of
which approach is taken, some guidance on the distinction would be useful.
Other possible revisions to the fair use provision include adding more
categories of preferred uses to the preamble of the section. Currently, the
preamble sets forth preferred categories of uses—e.g., “criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship[, and] research.”213 It would be
helpful to explicitly prefer uses of copyrighted works that are incidentally
captured during filming or recording, that are used to depict historical or
current events, and that are used in religious worship.214 As I will discuss, a
safe harbor for such uses may work better than adding these considerations
to fair use, but enumerating them in § 107 is also a potential option.
2. Creating Additional Safe Harbors
Even though I am skeptical that the fair use statute can be drafted with
greater clarity without losing some of the advantages of its breadth and
flexibility, the addition of some new safe harbors might help to facilitate the
assertion of fair use. Congress should add additional safe harbors for
particularly affected and worthy use communities, such as educators,
students, libraries, documentary filmmakers, and news gatherers. Although
the preamble to § 107 expressly prefers many of these categories and libraries
already have some protections pursuant to § 108, some additional protections
would help promote reasonable uses of copyrighted works. Any such
additional safe harbors should explicitly indicate that they do not narrow or
limit the fair use protections of § 107, as has been done in § 108.215 An
transformation”); Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 628–29 (9th
Cir. 2003) (affirming the district court’s holding that the use of some clips of Elvis’s films
and performances in a video about Elvis was not transformative because the voice-over did
not directly comment on those clips); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t,
Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 198–200 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that two-minute previews of copyright
holder’s films were not transformative because there was no critical commentary nor any
new material added); Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132,
142–43 (2d Cir. 1998) (declaring any transformative component of a book of trivia based on
the Seinfeld television series as “slight to non-existent”).
212. Rothman, supra note 76, at 490–93. Cf. Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair
Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004) (arguing that
many nontransformative uses are valuable).
213. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
214. See Rothman, supra note 76, at 513–28 (describing categories of preferred uses of
copyrighted works as including those that describe reality, promote intimacy, are cultural or
linguistic uses, or that facilitate the practice of one’s religion).
215. Section 108 provides that “[n]othing in this section . . . in any way affects the right
of fair use as provided by section 107.” 17 U.S.C. § 108(f)(4) (2012); see also Authors Guild,

1646

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29:1595

exemption for incidental uses of copyrighted works would be particularly
useful. Works that are captured during the filming of documentaries or news
reporting and are being used as part of this documentation of reality should
be exempted from liability for copyright infringement. Congress should also
provide an exemption for the use of religious texts for purposes of
worship.216
Congress also should develop a revised set of Classroom Guidelines,
developed with greater input from faculty, students, and libraries. The
revision should be expressly adopted as a safe harbor for certain educational
uses of materials. Such a provision should address many of the current
challenges in this arena, including the use of orphan works and online course
reserves.217
3. Limiting the Scope of Statutory Damages
One of the primary ways to support assertions of fair use is to protect
against the exposure to massive statutory damages (and potentially criminal
liability) for reasonably, but wrongly, assessing whether a particular use is
fair.218 As discussed, it is sometimes difficult to predict fair use (especially in
gray areas) and many individuals and smaller businesses may not be able to
pay for legal-opinion letters that would insulate them from findings of
willfulness for uses of copyrighted materials. Such a finding of willfulness
would put infringers into the higher statutory damages category and expose
them to criminal penalties.
Courts currently have the discretion to reduce statutory damages if an
infringer proves that she “was not aware and had no reason to believe
that . . . her acts constituted an infringement.”219 However, the broader
remittance provision, which applies when there are “reasonable grounds for
believing” that a use was fair, only applies to employees or agents of
nonprofit educational institutions, libraries, and archives (or those
institutions themselves), and, in more limited circumstances, to public
Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 456–57 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (rejecting plaintiff’s
argument that library could not assert a fair use defense because of the more specific § 108
that governs library usage).
216. Rothman, supra note 76, at 526–28 (discussing the need to use copyrighted
religious texts for worship).
217. Maria Pallante has also observed the need for renewed attention to creating some
safe harbors for higher education. See Pallante, supra note 1, at 333; see also DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, supra note 4, at 3 (suggesting that the § 108 library exception needs updating).
218. Cf. Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A
Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439 (2009) (criticizing the current system
of statutory damages and suggesting a variety of judicial and legislative reforms).
219. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2012).
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broadcasters.220 Congress could expand this fair use remittance provision or
at least provide some guaranteed—rather than discretionary—reduction in
statutory damages for reasonable but erroneous fair use assessments by
others. Only the most culpable actors, such as those engaged in large-scale
piracy, should be subject to high statutory damages and criminal liability,221
not those who have tried to stay on the right side of the law.
If an average person wrongly though reasonably assesses her chances of
having a successful fair use defense, she should not have to pay wildly more
than a reasonable licensing fee plus some fine.222 The statutory damages
should be sufficient to discourage unlawful copying and to incentivize
copyright enforcement, but should not be so massive that they discourage
future reasonable assertions of fair use.
It would also be helpful to clarify that a failure to conform to customary
licensing or clearance practices cannot form a basis of a willfulness finding
for purposes of assessing statutory damages or criminal liability. The
Copyright Office’s recent effort to provide an accessible database of fair use
decisions also may facilitate the ability of parties who cannot afford legal
counsel to make reasonable assessments of fair use that could insulate them
from findings of willful infringement.223
4. Creating a Personal-Use Exemption or Preference
The copyright system needs some public buy-in to work. Public support
requires people to think that on some level copyright law is fair. When
copyright law is wildly out of sync with community practices, there may be
value in interpreting copyright to conform to those understandings or, better
220. See id.
221. See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 218, at 509–10; Pallante, supra note 1, at
329 (suggesting retaining statutory damages, but considering tying them to actual harms or
profits in contexts where large numbers of works have been copied); Dep’t of Commerce,
supra note 4, at 102 (suggesting that some “recalibration” of statutory damages
might be appropriate in the context of “individual file-sharers” and
“secondary liability for large-scale online infringement”).
222. For examples of recent large statutory-damage awards against individual infringers,
see, e.g., Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 719 F.3d 67, 68 (1st Cir. 2013) (upholding
statutory-damages award of $675,000 for the unlawful downloading of thirty songs); Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 901–02 (8th Cir. 2012) (permitting a
$222,000 statutory-damages award for making twenty-four songs available via peer-to-peer
network), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1584 (2013). I note that neither of these defendants had
colorable fair use defenses, but these massive awards nevertheless deter other people from
relying on fair use.
223. Statement by Jacqueline Charlesworth, General Counsel, U.S. Copyright Office,
USPTO Roundtable, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles (July 29, 2014) (will be made available
at http://www.uspto.gov/ip/global/copyrights/).
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yet, amending the Copyright Act to reflect some of those norms. It may be
appropriate to adopt some sort of exemption or fair use preference for
limited personal uses. Not only has the public become accustomed to
personal uses, but there are also compelling normative reasons to allow such
uses. Personal uses promote self-expression, self-development, identifyformation, communication, and intimacy.224 Enforcing copyright against
personal uses also often conflicts with our privacy values and the important
goal of providing some surveillance-free zones.225 When drafting a personal
use exemption, Congress should focus on the motivation of the use and the
likely substitutionary (or nonsubstitutionary) impact of the use. Whether the
use is noncommercial or private should not be determinative.226 If a parent
puts up a video on YouTube of her child singing Let It Go from Disney’s hit
movie, Frozen, this is a public and potentially commercial use (advertising
revenue could potentially stream to the parent and, of course, to YouTube).
Nevertheless, this sort of use is motivated by an interest in sharing a realworld event and a parent’s enjoyment of her child’s singing. The use is not
likely to substitute for the original work—particularly if it was recorded with
the likely background noise of a chaotic household and is tied to the video
image. The fact that the posting is public and potentially revenue-generating
should not alter the analysis that this is a personal use.227
VII.

CONCLUSION

As I have previously noted in the context of reliance on customary
practices in intellectual property, “[l]eft unchecked, customary practices
threaten to swallow up IP law, and replace it with industry-led IP regimes
that give the public and other creators more limited rights to access and use
intellectual property” than were envisioned by the Constitution and
Congress.228 In copyright, these practices and other forms of private
ordering, such as technological controls and contracts, are altering the
boundaries of de facto copyright law every day. Some of these private efforts

224. See generally Rothman, supra note 76 (advocating greater protection for uses of
copyrighted works that promote mental integrity, intimate association, communication, and
religious practice).
225. See generally Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387 (2008)
(developing the argument for why intellectual privacy is essential to First Amendment
values); Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright Management”
in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996) (raising concerns about the effect of digital rights
management on our privacy and freedom of thought).
226. See Rothman, supra note 76, at 472–74, 528–32.
227. See id.
228. Rothman, supra note 7, at 1908.
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are beneficial, but others threaten our ability to engage with copyrighted
works.
Congress must confront private ordering as it revises the Copyright Act.
Although copyright law should continue to provide breathing room for
private experimentation, it cannot turn a blind eye to the negative
consequences that flow from some forms of private ordering. Copyright law
must prevent the lock-in of these alternative regimes and practices, and limit
the extent to which parties can extend copyright law through burdensome
private agreements and technologies that obliterate fair use. Codification of
some of the widely accepted and uncontroversial insights of copyright’s
private ordering also would lend greater clarity and public support to the
copyright regime. As we look forward to a Copyright Act for the twenty-first
century, Congress must not only consider the interests of large content
providers, but also those of the broader public. The Next Great Copyright
Act must find ways to not only limit online piracy, but also to protect the
public’s vital space to engage with, comment on, and rework copyrighted
material.
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